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PERSONALITY AND PSYCHOLOGY

JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM

PERSONALITY AND PSYCHOLOGY

An Analysis for Practical Use

BY

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To the Memory of
MY MOTHER

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FOREWORD

This volume, it is needless to say, is the work, not of a psychologist but of a personalist. A student of the nineteenth century, taught to reverence what has been called the soul, finds himself, as a teacher of to-day, confronted by developments in the field of psychology which seem to give the lie to much, one might almost say to all, of that body of philosophy, ethics, and religion upon which a working and sustaining theory of life has been built, grounded upon the stability and worth of the individual person.

It would be quite possible to pass this by as the idle wind which one respects not, ascribing whatever mutterings of an approaching storm assail the fortress of tradition to ephemeral winds of doctrine which will in time die away in the distance leaving the structures of the past secure. Or one might, on the other hand, exercise that anxious professional hospitality, now becoming a vogue, which avidly seizes the newest theory and holds it fast without first proving

it to be good,—an attitude which is neither truly religious nor truly scientific. Indeed certain demonstrations of this kind, which have appeared here and there, have been among the incentives which have led the writer to submit whatever findings of the new psychology he has been able to gather to the test of such rational examination as in him lies, in order to learn if they are in fact either so threatening to established conceptions of the soul as they appear to be, or so full of promise as many would fain find them.

The results of this study and reflection appear herein. The volume does not pretend to be a discussion of the new psychology, except in its attitude toward the self. None of the forms of the new psychology discussed receives either a sufficient statement or a sufficient criticism. It might seem better to have selected one or two of these and to have devoted the entire discussion to them. But on the other hand there is an advantage in confronting the entire phalanx of a movement, in order to get the situation as a whole before one, endeavoring to meet it not only in certain of its detailed aspects but as a whole.

The outline of selfhood, which constitutes the first part of the volume, seemed to be essential

for constructing a *pou sto* upon which to wrestle with the problems which follow. It is not intended, however, to be a mere preliminary to the criticism that ensues but to be a summary account of selfhood—in part restating and in part supplementing the author's "Personality and the Christian Ideal."

JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM.

Berkeley, California.

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PART I: A PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SELF

I devote myself to the study, not of fables, but of my own self, that I may see whether I am really a more complicated and a more furious monster than Typhon or a creature of a gentler and a simpler sort, the born heir of a divine and tranquil nature.

SOCRATES, in *Plato's Phædrus*.

PERSONALITY AND PSYCHOLOGY

Part I: A Psychology of the Self

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TO-DAY

Until of late psychology constituted a respectable and harmless department of philosophy, confined for the most part to academic traditions and text-books for college classes. It has now become a flood, inundating religious life, business, therapeutics, art, literature, education. It is not altogether easy to say whether this movement has come to bless or to curse. That will depend upon how it is interpreted and the use to which it is put.

PRESENT-DAY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE SELF

As the stream of psychology has overflowed its banks it has divided into several divergent

branches; one popular, therapeutic, more or less religious; another scientific, experimental, more or less naturalistic; a third practical, penetrating into many forms of business life; and still another educational, creating almost a revolution in this susceptible body of theory and practice. All of these currents are in a sense forms of the New Psychology, but more strictly the title should be reserved for the recent biological and physiological development of psychology.

It is thus that the phrase will be used in this volume. Schools, classes, cults, and camps representing these various phases of psychology have rapidly sprung up, books and periodicals have multiplied, and propaganda of various kinds has appeared overnight. There has been, and will be more and more, a process of internal restriction in the movement. One set of ideas —as William James said of parts of the mind— "dams up, even damns up," other sets.[1] One form of psychology will tend to dam another.

Yet, while these various schools and camps have little in common and are to a considerable degree hostile, they are at one, in the main, in ignoring what has hitherto been the presupposition and starting-point of psychology, *the self*,

[1] *The Energies of Men*, p. 36.

losing it either in the physical organism, or in the subconscious, or in the infinite All, or in the social whole. That psychology can get on successfully and accomplish large results without the recognition of a self has been amply proven; but to say that therefore *there is no self*, or that there is no psychology of the self, is a violent *non sequitur*. On the contrary, there is still a psychology of the self which has not only a past, but a present and a future, a psychology which is of permanent value and should not suffer itself to be crowded to the wall by the temporary supremacy of a selfless psychology.[2]

The present situation is a strong challenge to those who hold to the stability and worth of the self not only to reëstablish its reality but to endeavor to ascertain how far the knowledge of its nature and operations is affected by whatever fresh facts have been discovered and to learn what these facts may have to contribute to the great problem of how to think and how to live.

2 Perhaps the most conspicuous instance of a psychology of the self at the present time is that of Professor Mary W. Calkins, whose work is of a character which will not permit it to be overlooked. Professor Münsterberg made emphatic assertion of the reality of the self in his *Psychology and Life*. Professor Stratton has done likewise in his *Experimental Psychology and Culture*. Indeed the ignoring of the self is a very recent habit of psychologists.

Because of its concentration upon physiological factors on the one hand, and upon practical results which stop with prosperity, health and success on the other, present-day psychology is unintentionally but seriously lowering the spiritual values of life and narrowing its range and aims. The situation is such as to call for an earnest attempt to put to the test the findings of present-day psychology in order to discover what their bearing may be upon personal values and ideals, lest haply, if we lose these, life become, instead of what Hobbes called it, "nasty, brutish and short," sordid, empty and long.

THE VALUE OF THE INDIVIDUAL SELF

Until of late one might have taken for granted the supreme interest and worth of the individual self. To do this was to adopt a recognized *judgment of value*. This sense of the worth of the individual is one of the central convictions of Christianity, caught from the mind of Jesus. But this reason for holding it is no longer regarded as sufficient, in view of the findings of modern science, and must be reexamined. Is the individual, after all, of such importance in a universe in which he seems to have been reduced to cosmic insignificance—all

his boasted higher faculties shown to have come from his simian and pre-simian ancestry and to retain still many of their original characteristics? It will be one of the purposes of this discussion to enquire whether this origin and these *residua* in any way reduce the present greatness or future possibilities of the individual self.

How completely the best of human thinking and living has been based upon the principle of the worth of the individual—despite the failure to live up to it—will appear to any one who stops to consider it. It has animated our philosophy, our poetry, our preaching, and to some extent, at least, our practice. This sense of the superiority of persons to things may be illustrated by a quotation from the hobo poet who, in spite of his crudity and coarseness, had a vivid sense of the supreme worth of the individual man, Walt Whitman:

"When the psalm sings instead of the singer;
When the script preaches instead of the preacher;
When the pulpit descends and goes, instead of the carver that carved the supporting desk;
When I can touch the body of books, by night or by day, and when they touch my body back again;
When a university course convinces, like a slumbering woman and child convince;

When the minted gold in the vault smiles like the night-watchman's daughter;
When warrantee deeds loaf in chairs opposite, and are my friendly companions;
I intend to reach them my hand, and make as much of them as I do of men and women like you." [3]

This sentiment might be psychologically rendered somewhat as follows:

When the thought thinks instead of the thinker;
When the libido loves instead of the lover;
When the throat talks instead of the talker;
When I can touch the reactions of stimuli as I touch those who have reactions;
When a psychological seminar convinces as do a beloved teacher and pupil;
When the measurements in the psychologist's laboratory smile like the folk who are being measured,
When the educational tests work as well as the tests of machines;
I intend to revise my standard of values and make as much of these as I do of human selves like you.

THE MYSTERY OF PERSONALITY

What the self is and how it came to be, is one of the greatest of mysteries. Yet this fact does not diminish its reality, as is acknowledged

[3] *Carol of Occupations.*

in these words of a leading American psychologist:

> Little by little the veil of mystery falls away, now this fact and now that dropping into its natural place as an intelligible part of the universe of mind. And still the greatest mystery remains in that mind exists at all, a being transcending the limitations of time and space, encompassing within itself the uttermost ranges of knowledge, the heights and depths of feeling, the Alpha and Omega of personality.[4]

To a fresh consideration of the "Alpha and Omega of personality" the reader is invited to address himself, as the writer, without overlooking the mystery enveloping personality, endeavors to put before him, first, an outline of a psychology of the self and then a brief review of some of the forms of the selfless psychology now current, giving the whole subject a practical character by a study of some of the means by which persons are developed and related rightly to other persons.

INDIVIDUAL VS. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

The question may be asked whether the psychology of the self here presented is a social psychology. To that the answer is "No," if

[4] James R. Angell, *Chapters from Modern Psychology*, p. 304.

social psychology means what it is stated to be in the following excerpt from a recent volume on social psychology:

> Each man is an individual only in an incomplete sense; that he is but a unit in a vast system of vital and spiritual forces which, expressing themselves in the form of human societies, are working towards ends which no man can foresee; a unit whose chief function is to transmit these forces unimpaired, which can change or add to them only in infinitesimal degree, and which, therefore, has but little significance and cannot be accounted for when considered in abstraction from that system.[5]

To thus submerge the individual in the social whole, reducing his chief function to that of transmission, his influence upon his fellows to the infinitesimal and himself to a being of so slight a significance means to degrade the self and thus to cripple society. If, on the other hand, "society and the individual are aspects of the same thing, and it is a folly to set them in opposition," [6] then a psychology which magnifies the individual self as of worth to society when he is of worth in himself and of worth to himself when he is of worth to society is thus far at least a social psychology.

[5] William McDougall, *The Group Mind*, p. 8.
[6] Charles H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 1.

PSYCHOLOGY AND NATURALISM

The naturalistic character of the experimental type of the new psychology is one of its most evident features and will be freely combated as false, although it may be readily understood. It is extremely easy to let a scientific study of mental activity take the humanness out of humanity, the personality out of persons, the spirit out of the universe, and leave men mere mechanisms, automata, products (or by-products) of natural forces. The progress of this New Naturalism has been both rapid and sinister. It seems likely not only to work havoc in personal character and ideals but also to turn many against science itself. For of what profit is science if it materializes men and robs life of its hopes and ideals? One would rather be "a pagan suckled in a creed outworn" than to live in such a universe. If science is to dehumanize life we may well wish ourselves back in superstition rather than become the victims of a knowledge that, like the flame, attracts only to sear and destroy. But Naturalism is not science; *it is only a deduction from natural science* and one whose soundness there is every reason to question. Indeed present-day science is itself suggesting a spiritual interpretation of the

universe such as surpasses anything that the most ardent devotee of the life of the spirit has dreamed.

Is the new psychology—finding nothing in man beyond what is disclosed by biology, zoology, and anthropology—about to resolve human beings into victims of an all-devouring Nature? [7] Not if we maintain a view of human nature broad enough and deep enough to take in all the potencies "deep-seated in our mystic frame." To do this in the midst of the complexity of recently acquired and as yet uninterpreted knowledge is a task of sufficient difficulty to command the endeavor of many coworkers. What is needed is to see psychology steadily and see it whole, in the effort to discover whether there is not a real harmony of the natural and the spiritual, the ethical and the psychological, and whether our nature, which is proving itself more and more to be fearfully and wonderfully made, may not also prove itself adapted to ever greater and worthier ends.

[7] "The most striking phenomenon in recent American philosophy and psychology has manifestly been an extensive recrudescence of materialism." A. O. Lovejoy, "Pragmatism and the New Materialism," *The Journal of Philosophy,* January 5, 1922.

Chapter II

WHAT IS A SELF?

What is a self? The older psychology answered: A self is a reasoning being; reason being the distinguishing trait of man, instinct of the animal. The new psychology has revised, even if it has not wholly abolished, this distinction between man and animal. It points out that the animal reasons, at least it gives evidence of something very like reasoning, and that man has instincts. The older differentiation, then, seems to have broken down. We must seek another.

Starting with a well-established psychological analysis, a self may be defined as a being that knows and feels and wills. In other words he is an intelligent, affective, and conative individual. This is certainly true of man, but is it the definitive truth? Is it this that makes each of us a self? I think we must answer, No; for the animals, at least the higher animals, seem to possess a certain kind and degree not only of intelligence, but of emotion and will.[1]

[1] A student in one of my classes once described being kicked by a favorite horse as he was entering the stall. He said that

At least the animal has feeling as well as reasoning power, and manifests conation, in the sense of seeking its own well-being.[2] Yet there is something in selfhood which is not in the animal. What is it?

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, SELF-DIRECTION, SELF-EXPRESSION

Let us attempt another three-fold description and say: *A self is a self-conscious, self-directive, self-communicative ego.* This takes us nearer the soul of selfhood.

A self is self-conscious, a subject-object, the only subject-object. To see a star and know that one sees a star—to grasp in the same instant star and self—that is something that only a self can do. To be able to turn the inward eye upon oneself and say, *Iam an I,* is a feat of which nature apparently knows nothing.

The exercise of self-consciousness is so customary and familiar that it awakens in us no true sense of its real nature. We are so accustomed to associate the term self-consciousness

when the horse discovered who it was he showed clear signs of sorrow.

[2] Professor McDougall regards the sense of the reality of selfhood as grounded in conation. "One's own self is believed in as real, because we desire and strive and achieve, or fail." *Outline of Psychology,* p. 374.

with either vanity or vexation of spirit that we fail to recognize its true significance. So far is true self-consciousness from that self-sensitiveness which often goes by the name that it might even be said that one is most self-conscious when he is most self-forgetful; for when he is concentrating all his powers upon a responsible task he is more fully conscious of his real selfhood than at any other time.[3] The captain of a vessel which has struck an iceberg and is in imminent danger, feeling the whole responsibility for ship, crew, and passengers resting upon him, becomes fully himself, intensely but unselfishly aware of *himself* in every decision he reaches and every order he gives. Yet it is a wholly unselfish, *socialized* self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness is essential to something greater, *self-direction.* To be able to say: This is my chosen ideal, I will become this, or this, and then by bending one's whole energy in that direction to be able to realize somewhat at least of one's purpose—nothing below man can even dream of doing this. For it is one of the high prerogatives of the kingdom of selfhood.

Nor is self-direction all. Every self has the power in some degree of *self-expression.* To be able to objectify oneself, to put oneself outside

[3] See *Personality and the Christian Ideal,* p. 13.

of himself, so to speak, so as to impress himself constructively on the external world and upon the life of his fellow beings, in such a way that there will always be a difference wrought into the very universe itself—this is something whose full meaning it is difficult to realize. This power of self-expression makes man, when he is true to himself, a *creative* being, a maker, an artist, a fellow-laborer with whatever Power is fashioning the cosmos. The drawings of those Aurignacian cave men which to-day are studied with such care and interest are a foregleam of all that men have since created in art, science, literature, invention, and all the varied forms of individual and corporate endeavor. With what fine discernment George Eliot makes the great violin-maker say of God:

> "He could not make
> Antonio Stradivari's violins without Antonio."

INDIVIDUALITY

To be a self is thus to be, to a certain degree, sole, unitary, unique, unprecedented, and unrepeatable. This does not mean detachment from one's fellows. On the contrary, to be a true self one must be what Professor George H. Palmer calls a *conjunct self*. Every self, that

is, is an individual. So is every beast and bird, in its way, if not every amœba; yes, and every seed and plant, for each is a unit. Yet a unit as such is not an individual.[4] At what point individuality appears in the evolutionary process it is difficult to say. But the higher we rise in the moral and intellectual scale the more unique each individual becomes, the more marked are the characteristics which distinguish him from every other member of his species. Two peas are alike, though not exactly alike, in spite of the adage; yet their differences are not sufficient to give them individuality. Two St. Bernard dogs are alike, yet to one who knows them they have a genuine though limited individuality. Two humans are alike, yet how great the difference! Here is complete individuality. There is but one of each of us. Observe your neighbors and you will learn that. Even the characters of fiction are markedly individualized. There is but one King Hal, one Falstaff, one Mercutio, one Portia—and as for Shakespeare himself, when shall we see his like again?

When it comes to attempting to say what it is that makes one human individual differ from all others, we may succeed in getting at some

4 For a discussion of individuality as related to personality consult *Personality and the Christian Ideal,* Chapter III.

of the factors involved, but we fail to reach the heart of individuality. The variations in features and voice and manner are outer symbols of a still more astonishing difference of mental and moral make-up. There are, to be sure, certain more or less discernible human types, but even a student of types can claim only that "by establishing types we orient ourselves in the endless possibilities of individual differences." [5] From thumb-print to "personal atmosphere" we succeed in differing from one another unmistakably and endlessly. And the differences occur within the range of equally great similarities, due to racial, environmental and inherited kinships and influences. Similarities of vocation, trade and environment produce marked resemblances in appearance, behavior, and habits, but even these fail to render any two men exactly alike. We still remain incorrigibly and happily different. Our individual traits come to us largely without any responsibility of our own, but the most distinguishing factors in individuality are those alterations and moldings of inherited traits which we ourselves effect, not only refashioning our countenances, re-tuning our voices, and revising our manners,

[5] E. L. Thorndike, *Work and Fatigue Individual Differences*, p. 380.

but constructing the characters of which these are an expression, thus building up a selfhood which becomes ours by virtue of our own choices and acts.

FROM SELF TO PERSON

The self is an individual,—but is he a *person?* No; not yet. He is a potential person. *Every one has the capacity for personality, but one can become a person only by winning his way into the fellowship of moral worth.* A person is a self who by virtue of the exercise of his mental and moral powers has become a worthful contributor to the well-being of society.[6] To be a person, that is, is to be not only an *individuus* but a *socius.* How this is effected will engage us later. Meanwhile it is of the utmost moment to recognize the difference between an individual who is merely drifting, without aim or ideal—who possesses unused the powers of self-direction and self-expression—and the same individual when he has come to himself and is steering his course.

[6] In my former volume, *Personality and the Christian Ideal,* the terms self and person were used practically interchangeably, as is customary with many writers, but I now think the above distinction a needed one. How far it may have been used by others I do not know.

Study the faces of those whom you pass on the street. Can you truly say that each of them is a person? No; of many you must say that they are as yet only selves, individuals, with the capacity of becoming persons.

THE CONTINUITY OF THE SELF

To be a self, one must have a certain degree of identity, of continuity, and of unity. He must be in some sense the same self yesterday and to-day, if not forever. He must also be the same self in his home and in his office, in solitude and society, in health and sickness, in prosperity and adversity, and in every place where he may be, in Boston and in Bohemia, in Paris and in Canaan Corners.

At first thought this seems a simple requirement, but not at second thought. Are you really the same self as yesterday, last month, last year, twenty years ago, forty, fifty? Are you the same in different circumstances and environments? You certainly have undergone, and are undergoing, great changes—physical, mental, moral. Your cellular structure has changed, your features, your habits, your ideas, your associations, your outlook. Let your boyhood friend meet you thirty years later and he

peers into your face and listens to your voice, searching in vain for the chap he knew so well in years gone by.

Moreover you are conscious of feeling as if you were one self when you are well and another when you are ill, one self when you are among your friends and another when you are alone or among strangers. It is all puzzling and confusing, and you sometimes wonder as to your identity. And yet you cannot get away from the persistent conviction, which is shared by every one who knows you, that after all you *are* one self throughout all these strangely contrasted states, that the core of you is continuous.

IDENTITY AND ITS EVIDENCE

Since it is impossible to deny either the fact of change or the conviction of perdurance the conclusion would seem to be that there is in each of us *identity in change*. If so, what is the personal *continuum* that persists through all our changing states and our chameleon-like status of consciousness? It could hardly be compared to a chain on which are strung the colored beads of changing experiences, for the experiences are flowing and interfusing, and the

principle of continuity itself is vital and progressive rather than static and fixed. The continuity of a tree affords a closer analogy. The tree changes constantly from seedling to sapling, and sapling to fruit-bearing, and thence to maturity and decay. It alters in appearance, in structure, in function, in the periods of its life-cycle, and yet it remains the same tree, and has a continuous existence. Yet when we come to ask, "What makes it the same?" we are puzzled for an answer.

So with a human being. We are the self-same selves throughout our changing experience. Yet what makes us the same? What subtle substratum carries on our selfhood throughout the changes going on within us and the constant flow of events and experiences? It is foolish to think to find it in any physical center. Even if that were discovered it would not explain personal continuity. But while we may not be able to find the cause of our self-continuity, we may easily find evidence and guarantee of it.

The outstanding evidence of the continuity of selfhood is memory. Let your boyhood friend who is trying in vain to find something to which to tie this grave senior but ask: Do you remember Jones' Woods, or the Swimmin' Hole or the time we went fishing and got lost?

Instantly the intervening years drop away and the old companionship is resumed. Memory is the witness and guarantee of continuity. But is it the *continuum* itself? Hardly that. You recall an incident in your childhood or youth and are sure that it happened and happened to you, but that *you* seems almost like a stranger to your present self. Yet you know that it was you yourself, nevertheless, and that the vivid memories that mark the road along which you have come, like sign-posts, are evidences that the same self has passed along the road and now goes on into a future in which it will continue to hold fast the sacred thread of memory which keeps one from being lost in the labyrinth of life.

IDENTITY AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

The continuity of selfhood is the ground of the moral responsibility which attaches to each of us throughout our lives and which no chicanery, psychological or otherwise, will allow us to escape. The conviction that we are accountable for the facts of our whole past is embedded deeply not only in our training but in our consciousness. Common Law, which gives security to society, rests upon it. The crime committed

yesterday, or ten years ago, is ours still and must be answered for before the law, personal and civil.

Doubtless the principle of moral responsibility has often been too stringently and stupidly applied, but unless it holds good the whole social order will fall apart. There is much today in the teaching of psychology and sociology to break down, or cast suspicion upon, this principle built up through generations of moral experience; but it may be trusted to hold. What is needed is not to abrogate it but to study how to apply it with a juster and more intelligent regard for all the factors and conditions involved. Whatever adaptations and modifications of it, due to heredity, or temperament, or peculiar conditions, should be made, moral accountability itself is not something to tamper with or toss lightly into the changing current of theory and experiment.

SELF-CONTINUITY AND DEVELOPMENT

With his vivid sense of the reality and distinctness of each passing thought, William James devised a theory which provides a kind of staccato continuity of selfhood, flattering to

the passing thought but not to the perduring thinker. Here is his description of it:

> If the states of consciousness be recorded as realities, no "substantial" identity in the thinker need be supposed. Yesterday's and to-day's states of consciousness have no *substantial* identity, for when one is here the other is irrevocably dead and gone. But they have a *functional* identity. . . . This functional identity seems the only sort of identity in the thinker which the facts require us to suppose. . . . The thoughts themselves are the thinkers.

Professor James presented this as only "a provisional solution" sufficient for the psychologist, —but certainly for no one else. What is lacking in this account of continuity? While James was very sensitive to the presence of *change,* he failed, as do almost all the professional psychologists, to recognize the meaning of *development* in the experience of the self. To miss this is to miss one of the chief factors of the personal order.

Nowhere is the process of development so striking and so significant as in the realm of personality.[7] Personal development has a marked analogy to growth in the organism, yet

[7] See *Personality and the Christian Ideal,* Chapter IX.

it has a character and method of its own. To make it identical with the process of evolution in nature is to overlook the principle of succession, to explain the higher in terms of the lower, and thus to miss the progressive character of the whole developmental process. Not that Professor James was among those guilty of this subversion. Yet he did not grasp the real meaning of development in personality, as one finds it, for instance, in Browning.

In the higher sphere of personal development the processes of evolution are transformed into forms so much finer and subtler that one with difficulty traces the kinship between them and their biological antecedents. The struggle for existence becomes the struggle for character. The survival of the fittest becomes the leadership of the best. Mechanical imitation becomes admiring emulation. Thus does *development* in the personal realm succeed and fulfill *evolution* in the organic realm.[8] "Out of the strong cometh forth sweetness, and out of the eater cometh forth meat." The continuity of selfhood is that which constitutes the abiding center in the personal developmental process and without which it would have no meaning.

[8] Miss Cora Williams, in her volume, *Creative Involution*, has made the interesting suggestion that this process in the personal realm be termed *involution*.

A self-conscious, self-directive, self-expressive, creative unity, continuous in change and developing either toward or away from moral personality—such is the self. At least such is the self in terms of definition and analysis. But this is only the skeleton. Let us attempt to clothe it with flesh and blood.

Chapter III

THE SELF AND THE BODY

The wisdom and experience of the race have settled upon two working convictions regarding the relation of the body and the soul—that they are distinct, and that they are in a very close and intricate intimacy.

THE DISTINCTNESS OF SOUL AND BODY

In the first of these convictions both the primitive mind and the philosophic mind concur. The animism of the savage, crude and childish though it is, is not without vital meaning for us as well as for him. If he thinks of the soul as so loosely tenanting his body as to threaten to flit away through his open mouth in sleep or when he coughs or sneezes, and if his absorbing concern is for his body, rather than for this will-o'-the-wisp within, still his firm belief in its existence is a significant fact. Here is a strong conviction, arising at the very dawn of intelligence, that there is something within

every man invisible and intangible, but real.[1] It is true that to the savage the soul was but a kind of dual of the body, with all its appetites, needs, and traits continuing after death, yet the fact that in this early stage of human thought its existence was firmly believed in points to some basal reality upon which it rested.

When philosophy arose to take the place of this crude primitive faith, so far from setting it aside as untenable, philosophic thought, in its major movement at least, tended to ratify and rationalize it. It is with a fine blending of the serious and the humorous that Plato in his Phædo makes Socrates say as he sits with his friends in the prison awaiting death:

> For, by the dog of Egypt, I think that these muscles and bones would long ago have been in Megara or Bœotia, prompted by *their* opinion of what is best, if *I* had not thought it better and more honorable to submit to whatever penalty the State inflicts rather than escape by flight.

Here is unquestioning recognition of an *I*, a self, closely associated with the body yet sovereign over it at whatever cost of pain and distress. Aristotle coincides with Plato in the recognition

[1] See J. G. Frazer: *The Golden Bough,* Chapter XVIII.

of the duality of body and soul, and after them follows the main succession of philosophy through medieval and modern thought to our own day.

The early glimmering consciousness of a radical distinction between body and soul, confirmed by philosophy, has deepened with the growth of introspection and reflection into an established conviction. Yet not without challenge, vigorous and repeated, and never so strong and insistent as at the present day when an influential school of philosophy and psychology would reduce all that has borne the semblance of a soul to misinterpreted bodily sensations.

THE INTIMACY OF SELF AND BODY

It must be confessed that as a result of the findings of biology, physiology, and psychology there is much that would lead to the assumption of the identity of soul and body, or rather to the acceptance of body as the sole reality. Yet the facts which point in that direction may be better explained on the basis of the other conviction alluded to at the outset, i.e., the intimacy of self and body, an intimacy so close and penetrative that not only whatever affects the

one affects the other but that through the one the other finds its meaning and expression.[2]

By no mere scientific or experimental process can the nature and extent of this intimacy of body and self be fully determined. It goes too deep and involves too much.[3] So interpenetrative are these two, so mutually dependent, that it is impossible to tell where the physical leaves off and the personal begins. Nevertheless they cannot be fused, any more than the inorganic and organic, whose line of demarcation is equally obscure.

In everyday living the temptation to identify the body with the self is the source of much misery and misunderstanding. When the head aches, or the liver is clogged, or the nerves are exhausted, it seems as though one's very selfhood were disrupted. He is tempted to say to himself—and not infrequently to others—"I myself am the victim of this disorder." And yet in yielding to this inclination one is secretly aware that he is allowing something that is not

2 The issue between interactionism and opposing theories is admirably stated in the volume, *Matter and Spirit,* by Professor James B. Pratt, New York, 1922.

3 So close is this intimacy that G. F. Stout regards the body as "part and parcel of the self . . . though it can never be regarded as the whole self or even as the most essential part of the self." *Manual of Psychology,* p. 553 (second edition).

his real self to dominate him. When he can locate his ill-feeling in some part of the body it is easier to realize that the disaffection is physical; but even when he cannot locate it the sensation of physical disturbance does not obliterate the conviction that, though pain casts so dark a shadow over the self, it remains intact and unharmed. It is here that Christian Science and New Thought, in spite of their crudities and falsities, have done good service, i.e., in suggesting that one keep his spirit undaunted at such times by saying to himself: "I, the self, am not affected; I, the self, am well." That is good philosophy, good psychology, and good therapeutics also.

THE SELF NOT RIGIDLY BOUND TO THE BODY

That the self is thus intimately attached to the body does not necessarily mean that it is *confined* to the body, much less that it is *in* the body, in the sense of being located at some point in it. No such spatial fixity is thinkable. Even the savage mind held that the soul could leave the body in dreams and return to it again. The intelligence of to-day has left far behind so crude an idea, but it perceives still more clearly that the body is no cage for the mind.

Wherever the imagination takes one there the self in some sense goes.

> "My soul to-day
> Is far away,
> Sailing the Vesuvian Bay."

The connection of the self with the body is relative, rather than absolute. As Bergson says, "The *I* is something which appears, rightly or wrongly, to overflow every part of the body which is joined to it, passing beyond it in space as well as in time."[4] The intimacy is one of vital attachment rather than of rigid bondage, one which admits either of irritation and injury to both body and mind or of mutual advantage and harmony.

In the close and fateful intimacy of self and body the vital question is: Are they friends or enemies? Which, if either, should be master and which servant?

THE SELF THE MASTER OF THE BODY

Here again the better judgment of the race based upon its long experience has reached a conviction which is not to be lightly set aside. It is, in effect, that, while the question of friend-

[4] *Mind-Energy*, p. 38.

liness or hostility may still be an open one, in any case the self should be the master and the body the servant. This is the verdict in the main of both ethics and religion. True, it does not command the unanimous assent of either, since hedonistic ethics and pantheistic forms of religion have both veered away from it, but it is the major and controlling conception of men whose lives are morally and religiously controlled. Plato spoke for all such, although he too much depreciated the body, when he said:

> Of all a man's possessions, after the gods, his soul is the most godlike, being his truest self. To every man his all is dual. To the stronger and better things pertains mastery, to the lesser and baser servitude; wherefore always a man should honor the master parts of himself above the servile.[5]

THE CHRISTIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE BODY

Granted the rightful mastery of the self over the body, the way it is to be exercised is by no means a settled matter, even for Christianity. For Christianity has never completely worked out its conception of the relation of the soul to the body. It has always faced the problem in the light of the time and the environment.

[5] *The Laws,* Book V.

It was in this light that Paul met the issue in the life of the early Church. Realizing the intensity of the struggle with pagan immorality, as the Gentile Christians had to meet it, Paul naturally threw the flesh and the spirit into a juxtaposition which he often represented as a mortal conflict. "The flesh and the spirit war against one another." "For these two are contrary the one to the other." "The body is dead because of sin but the spirit is life because of righteousness." [6]

Yet it is to be remembered that by the term *flesh* Paul does not mean the body as such but the *whole temper and attitude of mind which gratifies appetite at the expense of higher ends*, and which makes one unsocial and selfish through and through. When he is dealing with the problems of sense and of its relation to the external world Paul shows a marked catholicity and comprehensiveness of judgment, as illustrated, for example, in the implications and applications of such a statement as this: "I know, and am persuaded in the Lord Jesus, that nothing is unclean of itself: save that to him who accounteth anything to be unclean, to him it is unclean." [7]

[6] *Romans* viii.
[7] *Romans* xiv: 14.

In the period of the rise and development of anchoritism, and later of monasticism and the ascetic ideal, and later still in the upspringing of Puritanism, the relation of the soul to the body was set forth in terms of emergencies that seemed to call for the most heroic and extreme emphasis upon the moral nature in order to defeat the excesses and abuses of the physical. These ascetic and puritanic principles, as every Christian knows, are not the standards and ideals of the Christianity of to-day. Nevertheless Christianity has always held, and still holds, that the soul is inherently superior to the body and should hold mastery over it, while it constantly endeavors to secure a true adjustment and harmonious working between them. Christianity takes this attitude because it sees that morality requires that body and self be distinguished. Without this distinction and the relationship of superior and subordinate, morality loses all meaning and becomes a mere abnormality and illusion. It is because we have physical appetites and needs and capacities, which should be regulated and controlled and devoted to the highest ends of personality, individual and social, that moral restraints and ideals play so central a part in life. Identify self and body,

and let every one act accordingly, and the issue will be—chaos, individual and social, moral and physical.

PRISONERS OF DEFECTIVE BODIES

In sad contrast to the harmony between a sound body, housing a normal and reliant self, is the discord of a diseased body or brain thwarting a dwarfed and hampered self. There are two ways of regarding the unfortunate victims of pathological conditions not of their own compounding whom we call *defectives*. The ordinary habit is to consider them personally, as well as physically, hopelessly inferior, with nothing ahead but increasing darkness to the end. But it may be that we should be nearer the truth to think of them as imprisoned selves, looking out of the grated windows of their temporary cells with a pathetic semi-consciousness that the defect is not so much in themselves as in their hampering physical organism. In such "defectives" one sometimes catches faint gleams of a higher intelligence and a larger selfhood, awakening the hope that when they are released from bondage into the freedom of an ampler life they will take their places as peers of those

who mistakenly identified their prison house with themselves.[8]

DOES THE SELF DECAY WITH THE BODY?

One of the most subtle and least understood interactions of the self and the body is the relation of the development and subsequent decay of the body to the development and maturing of the self. Clearly there is a certain parallelism between the two processes, but just as clearly it is not exact. The mind reaches the climax of its powers, character comes to its richest attainment, after the physical organism has passed its zenith and is well on its way toward decay. As George Wither quaintly put it: "I grow and wither both together." And yet we have been too much accustomed to consign the later years of life to a general break-up and inconsequence. We think and speak of the self as growing old along with the body and by the power of suggestion we thus depreciate and depotentialize both self and body.

The whole process of growing old is more or less of a fiction, one may almost say of an obsession. The symptoms of age may appear

[8] Of course this physical disability prevents the normal development of selfhood, but the possibilities are there.

in consequence of physical exhaustion, at any period of life. A youth, or even a child, with slight physical or mental vigor, though he continues to develop, is old before his time; and many a vigorous aged person is youthful, zestful, high-hearted, far beyond the portals of three score and ten. After passing middle life one is accustomed—with variations—to pass through all the familiar periods of life daily. In the morning he is a youth, with all of youth's hope and zest; by midday he has passed into the zone of middle life with its doubts and disabilities; and when the day wanes he has become worn and old, though not without the compensating serenity of age. Yet, take the days together and age is pretty nearly synonymous with fatigue and ill health. Banish these and it becomes pretty much a myth, if the mind is well equipped and the spirit well sustained.

For the aging or non-aging of an individual is determined more by the mind than the body.[9] An alert and well-trained mind, a heart responsive to truth and beauty, a will that holds the physical nature to high purpose, a soul that has found a strength beyond its own,—these, while they cannot prevent ultimate decay and dissolu-

[9] Of course it will be said that the activity of the mind depends upon the activity of the brain, but is not the reverse also true?

tion, succeed in so informing and using the body that the summit of personality often lies close to or beyond the orthodox age of senility and death.

One of the finest compensations of the maturing mind is its ripening appreciation of beauty. The sense of beauty is doubtless keener and more intense in youth, when the senses are fresh and alert, but, partly for that very reason perhaps, the intellectual appreciation of the beautiful in youth is limited and unobservant. Youth does not perceive the pervasiveness, the manifoldness, the range and variety of beauty. Only years, that bring the esthetic as well as the philosophic mind, can enable one to turn the pages of the Book Beautiful with sufficient care not only to appreciate all of its full-page illustrations but not to miss any of its vignettes and illuminations.

Chapter IV

CONSCIOUSNESS, SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

In his fascinating Huxley lecture, "Life and Consciousness"—a philosophic drama of the Development of Life—Bergson defines *life* as "freedom inserting itself within necessity, turning it to its profit." *Consciousness,* he describes as choice, its rôle being "to decide," and as such probably present in all existences which "move spontaneously" and which have "a decision to take." [1] He further describes consciousness as linking *memory*—whose office is "conservation and accumulation of the past in the present"—with *anticipation.* "Consciousness is then, as it were, the hyphen which joins what has been to what will be, the bridge which spans the past and future." [2] Consciousness would thus seem to be present in a germinal state in all life that has reached the stage of mobility and to increase in volume and perfection until it reaches its culmination in man.[3]

[1] *Mind-Energy,* p. 14.
[2] *Ibid.,* p. 9.
[3] A somewhat similar description of consciousness is given by James R. Angell in his *Introduction to Psychology.*

Here is a description of consciousness full of suggestion. But has Bergson given to consciousness as wide a range as it really covers? Has he not defined one phase of it only?—that which attends the creative activity of life, which it has been his peculiar mission to interpret.

Judging from consciousness as we know it in ourselves, it seems to accompany *feeling*. Wherever feeling exists, and in whatever form, may we not assume the presence of consciousness as its accompaniment and explicant? [4]

It is, however, with the presence of consciousness in human beings that we are chiefly concerned. In ourselves consciousness is intimately connected with the nervous system. "All nerve activity has its psychic correspondent; consciousness as we know it, being a specially organized form of this psychic existence." [5] Yet it by no means necessarily follows that consciousness is a *product* of the nervous system. It might be quite as true to say that the nervous system is a product of consciousness. All that can be affirmed is that the two belong together, act and interact upon each other.

[4] Fechner's well-known attribution of consciousness to plants in his *Nanna* may be referred to here.

[5] Henry Rutgers Marshall, *Mind and Conduct*, p. 25.

FROM CONSCIOUSNESS TO SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

If *consciousness* belongs to all living organisms that possess feeling, *self-consciousness* is peculiar to the self. What, then, is this inner mirror we call self-consciousness? Is it a developed form of consciousness, or something supernatural, a priest forever after the order of Melchizedek, having neither beginning of days nor end of life?

Granted its inherent superiority in the conscious order, it is in no sense derogatory to it if self-consciousness has emerged from lower forms of consciousness by the lowly pathway of development. All analysis would lead us to infer that as consciousness grew more and more acute in the evolutionary process, both as the register of feeling and as intimately connected with choice, it would more and more turn in upon itself in the individual, so that he would come to recognize his states as being his own. Thus there would gradually differentiate and develop that signal diremption—the *I* and the *me*.

Self-consciousness is to be carefully distinguished from *body-consciousness,* although the term is often used in that sense. If one thinks

of his body as himself, or part of himself, he will have a confused sense of selfhood. Such confusion is characteristic of the state of *invalidism,* in which one cannot get above identifying every slightest physical sensation with himself, so that he is at the mercy of every draught that blows and every nerve that twinges. It is quite true, of course, that consciousness of self cannot be detached from the body, since our whole consciousness is intimately bound up with the action of the brain and nervous system. So intimate is this relationship that one is conscious of some sensation in a part of his body, or perhaps over his whole body, whenever he has an especially keen consciousness of himself—whether it be of a sensitive and selfish, or a self-forgetful and unselfish kind. Whenever the *I* is thrust into prominence by some exceptional experience or situation, the physical nature is naturally affected. Nevertheless the self and the body are not to be identified. The core of the self-conscious state is in something that transcends the body, and the physical reaction may be regarded as secondary and sympathetic rather than as primary and constitutive.

Self-consciousness may be in effect very trivial or very worthful according to the self whose it

is. Yet in itself—whether it be a product of evolution or not—it is an invaluable possession. Without it there could be no real differentiation of one individual from another, indeed no consciousness of others as selves.

THE MAPPING OF THE MIND

For graphic purposes our psychic life, as deciphered by modern psychology, may be likened to a number of overlying fluent light zones, separated by thin membranes easily broken through. The upper zone lies in sunshine, though shadowed by frequent clouds. This is the realm of the *conscious,* where attention, thought, purpose are at work. This zone has a fringe of *coconsciousness,* where the light shades off toward the next zone, a twilight zone where subtle psychical or psycho-physical forces are carrying on their functions, the area of *subconsciousness.* Underneath this, in turn, is a zone of darkness—darkness which according to psychology may be *felt*—though only in its effects. This is the region of the *unconscious.*[6]

Although these zones may be conceived as

[6] It is an interesting question whether the unconscious belongs to the self or to its physical environment. Leonard Hodgson seems to me to assign it rightly to one's environment, rather than to himself. See *The Hibbert Journal,* July, 1922.

in a measure distinct, they are in vital relation, each being essential to the others, a constant interchange and interpenetration going on between them. A ray of light from consciousness may at any moment penetrate into the subconscious and expose what is going on there. Or an activity from the subconscious may, through some disturbance there, "uprush" into consciousness and engage the active attention of the conscious self, sometimes to his advantage—as when Socrates' demon warned him of impending danger—sometimes to his undoing, as when an animal impulse overmasters one.

The lowest, spatially speaking, of these zones, that of the unconscious, would seem to consist of biological, racial, and ancestral heritages which in the evolutionary process have lodged within the outer precincts of the individual self and there unconsciously create and diffuse impulses and inhibitions which influence, and to a degree mold, the life. Into this dark abyss of the unconscious are supposed to descend experiences which lapse from conscious memory, which may be recoverable, but often only by exceptional means. It is an interesting problem where, in this zoning of the mind, to locate those phobias, or "broken-off bits of consciousness"

which cause such serious disturbance. Presumably in the subconsciousness.[7]

Yet this mapping of the psychic life by no means commands the assent of all psychologists. To Professor Hobhouse, for example,

> the field of consciousness appears not like a material object with clear-cut outlines, but more like the halo of light which a lamp projects into the darkness. There is a gradation from the focus of the rays to their extreme verge, and the outline of light is not clearly marked. Light fades into darkness. But that is not all, and when we pursue the matter further the image of the lamp requires modification. For not only is there an oscillation between the light and the dark which we might compare to the effect of a swinging of the lamp, but what goes on in the dark affects the lighted area just as if it had passed there.[8]

THE SUPER-CONSCIOUSNESS

Whatever may be the best representation of the psychic flow, it is a fair question whether

[7] Many extraordinary powers have been attributed to the subconsciousness, among them that of solving baffling problems. Professor Woodworth comments upon this as follows: "The difficulty, when you first attacked the problem, arose from false clews, which, once they got you, held you by virtue of their 'recency value.' The matter laid aside, these false clews lost their recency value with lapse of time, so that when you took the matter up again you were free from their interference and had a good chance to go straight towards the goal." *Psychology*, p. 564.

[8] L. T. Hobhouse, *Development and Purpose*, p. 23.

there should not be included in it a zone, or a fringe, or an illumination of some sort, in addition to those already noted, which comes from the realm that we call personal. Just as influences from the realm of nature work upon us from below, so unseen influences may be descending upon us from what may be called the *super-consciousness,* the realm of the spirit.

A CONCRETE ILLUSTRATION

To recur to an illustration previously made use of,[9] suppose I am busy in my study, my main consciousness being engaged, let us say, on Wells' "Outline of History," which calls for a rather wide stream of consciousness, in which are blended currents of imagination as well as a considerable activity of the critical faculty, and suppose the room to be underheated. I will have a distracting co-consciousness of physical chill which neither the extremely interesting contents of the book nor my own will-power is able entirely to suppress. Meanwhile the action of my physical organs is going on without report in consciousness. I may at times be dimly conscious of the action, let us say, of the lungs or heart, but as a rule these go on sub-

[9] See my *Mysticism and Modern Life,* pp. 139 ff.

consciously or unconsciously. Other subconscious activities enter my total mental ensemble. There is also, either on the fringe of consciousness or in the subconscious, *the sense of place.* In order to be at ease the mind must always have the sense of where one is physically. One must be able to answer the question: Where am I? or he is at once thrown into confusion and distress, as is the case in certain forms of senile insanity. But this is not *all* of my total inner activity during this period. There is, somewhere within my total psychic furnishing, a store of memories, one of which may at any moment be instantly started out of its lethargy by something on the page I am reading and emerge in consciousness, waxing and fading as I continue my task. Moreover, all this time I may be enveloped, so to speak, in a subtle personal, spiritual atmosphere—surrounded by a cloud of witnesses, as it were—proceeding from recent or more remote contacts with persons by whom my mood is more or less colored; and from this *superconsciousness* influences may affect me bringing with them a subtle feeling of presence, of companionship, or of disturbance, which colors the whole atmosphere in which I am working and thus the character of the result itself. What psychologist has taken due ac-

count of the latter factor in experience? And yet who can deny that it is real? A man who has had a quarrel with his wife before he left home will be under the influence of it all day and everything he does will be different from what it would have been had they parted as lovers should. Or if one is accustomed to the habit of true prayer his whole mental attitude is bathed in an atmosphere for which a sufficient psychology is bound to find some adequate explanation. To assign this religious activity to the subconscious alongside physical ones seems less reasonable than to associate it with personal influences.

We are accustomed to assume that these various elements of the inner life are the discovery of modern psychology. But in the ancient Yoga philosophy of India there was an analysis of man into various principles which seem to anticipate, in some respects, present distinctions, viz.: The Physical Body, the Mental Body, Prana (or Vital Force), the Instinctive Mind, the Intellect, the Spiritual Mind, and Spirit. Among these principles Prana seems to represent what science is making so much of to-day as *vital force.* Instinctive Mind corresponds, it is claimed, to that which in recent years has been classed by western psychologists as the "subjec-

tive" or "subconscious" mind.[10] "Spiritual Mind is that Something Within which leads to higher thoughts, desires, aspirations, and deeds,"[11] while Spirit would appear to correspond in some measure at least to superconsciousness.[12]

Here is a considerable anticipation, apparently, of certain aspects of present-day psychology, yet neither ancient nor modern psychology has fathomed the tides of the inner life.

THE SUPREME PLACE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN LIFE

With the recognition of so many currents or zones of the inner life, the question of their right relationship and evaluation becomes a matter of the greatest importance. The tendency to-day is to emphasize the subconscious and unconscious, which have so long been overlooked. Undoubtedly much is to be gained both in the understanding and in the guidance of our nature by such study. Yet, after all, the main thing is to keep the *conscious intelligence* with all diligence, for out of it are the issues of life.[13]

[10] H. M. Tichenor, *Biology and Spiritual Philosophy*, p. 41.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 49.
[12] Scholastic Buddhism reached, I am told, a similar distinction.
[13] *Proverbs* iv: xxiii. In Hebrew psychology the heart is the seat not of the emotions but of the intellect.

In his notable volume, "Man's Supreme Inheritance," Mr. Alexander has pointed out "a constant conflict between two great forces, the one (subconscious) destined to exercise supreme directive powers during the early stages of human evolution, the other (conscious) to supersede this limited directive and finally to prove the reliable guide through the higher and highest stages of the great evolutionary scheme which leads to the full enjoyment of his potentialities." [14] This guide he well terms *conscious control.*

With the present emphasis upon the unconscious and subconscious it is of the utmost consequence to remember that "the best and purest aspect of the mind, the aspect of it most highly developed and the most nobly human, is to be found not in the obscure shadows of the background, but in the clear light of consciousness." [15]

[14] P. 186.
[15] J. B. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness,* p. 52.

Chapter V

MEMORY AND IMAGINATION

In the simplest use of the term, memory means *the power of recall.* We take this power for granted as something that belongs to mind; and so it does. But *how* are our experiences retained? Why are some of them lost? And is this loss permanent or only temporary? These are questions which the older psychology has never been able to solve. Has the new psychology anything to contribute to their solution?

THE UNCONSCIOUS AS THE RESERVOIR OF MEMORIES

Scientific exploration often opens up a mass —not to say a mess—of unarticulated phenomena which prove disturbing to our smug, well-formulated systems; for these systems too frequently ignore what Bergson calls "the sinuous and mobile contours of reality." It is so in psychology. One is reminded of the note, garnered by Mark Twain, which was sent by a mother to a teacher of physiology, "Dear

Teacher, Don't tell Jane any more about what's inside of her. It sets her agin her food." It is not a little disconcerting to discover what is inside of our minds as the phenomena are unfolded, tabulated, and interpreted by psychological investigators who are by no means averse to startling the sober-minded adherents of tradition. That vasty deep termed the Unconscious into which recent psychology has been endeavoring to peer—what does it disclose? Consciousness looking into the unconscious arouses some rather puzzling queries, such as how we can become conscious of the unconscious without its ceasing thereby to be unconscious. But such slight difficulties must be overlooked by all who would follow the psychological gleam.

The new psychology is disposed to regard the unconscious as the reservoir of what may be termed *the unforgotten forgotten,* i.e., of experiences which have dropped out of the range of the ordinary memory and yet may be still recoverable.

DOCTOR MORTON PRINCE'S THEORY OF UNCONSCIOUS MEMORIES

For an example of this interpretation of the unconscious one cannot do better than to turn

to the opening of the second chapter of Doctor Morton Prince's highly technical lectures, *The Unconscious.*

If we take a suitable subject, one in whom *"automatic writing"* has been developed, and study the content of the script, we may find that to a large extent it contains references to, i.e., memories of, experiences which have long been forgotten by the subject and which cannot even by the stimulus of memoranda be voluntarily recalled. These experiences may be actions performed even as far back as *childhood,* or passages read in books, or fragments of conversation, etc. Thus B.C.A., who suffers from an intense fear or phobia of cats, particularly *white* cats, can recall no experience in her life which could have given rise to it. Yet when automatic writing is resorted to the hand writes a detailed account of a fright into which she was thrown, when she was only five or six years of age, by a white kitten which had a fit while she was playing with it. The writing also describes in minute detail the furnishings of the room where the episode occurred, the pattern of the carpet, the decorative designs of the window shades, the furniture, etc.[1]

From such experiments as this Dr. Prince concludes that conscious memory is only a particular type of memory, that past experiences are conserved in the unconscious, and that some of them at least are recoverable. In attempting

[1] Morton Prince, *The Unconscious,* pp. 15, 16.

to determine the way in which this conservation of experiences takes place Dr. Prince advances an ingenious theory of brain *neurograms* which are "organized physiological records of passing mental experiences." [2] *"The unconscious is the great storehouse of these neurograms* which may also function as subconscious processes exhibiting intelligence and determining mental and bodily behavior." [3]

This and all other theories of memory as in some way causally connected with the structure of the brain depend, as Bergson points out, upon the theory of *parallelism.* Yet this theory is at best but a mechanico-metaphysical hypothesis which has no sufficient evidential basis.[4]

A far more reasonable theory is, that one's whole past is preserved, as Bergson holds, memory being not so much a recollection of past experiences as *the construction of experiences into another form,* which thus pass from an *actual* existence into a *virtual* existence, as he terms it.

A UNIVERSAL CONSERVING CONSCIOUSNESS

If all our experiences are preserved, *where* are they preserved? Not necessarily in the

[2] Morton Prince, *The Unconscious,* p. 147.
[3] *Ibid.,* p. 150.
[4] See J. B. Pratt, *Matter and Mind,* Chapter II.

brain, which would thus be a cavernous container of picture films, nor in the unconscious, which is too much like a bottomless pit. A not-impossible alternative theory is that of a *Universal Consciousness* into which every experience passes and from which it may emerge—yet not detached from the individual in whose consciousness it took place. Something of this sort, yet without reference to universality, is suggested in a remarkable passage in Bergson's lecture, "The Soul and the Body," from which I quote:

> I believe that our whole past exists. It exists subconsciously, by which I mean that it is present to consciousness in such a manner that, to have the revelation of it, consciousness has no need to go out of itself or seek for foreign assistance; it has but to remove an obstacle, to withdraw a veil, in order that all that it contains, all in fact that it actually is, may be revealed. Fortunate are we to have this obstacle, infinitely precious to us is the veil! The brain is what secures to us this advantage. It keeps our attention fixed on life.[5]

But if the brain, instead of being the storehouse of memory, is its *curtain,* wisely shutting out all but such fragments as are useful for life, what is behind the curtain? Is it merely an individual consciousness or a Universal Consciousness?

[5] *Mind-Energy,* p. 70.

Suggestions of something like a Universal Consciousness of all our experiences break through the opening verses of the one hundred and thirty-ninth psalm and appear in the child-like tradition of the "recording angel." Is there a psychological truth back of these? Who knows? At all events memory is a vastly larger and more significant potency than it is customarily regarded as being in our commonplace inventory of the mind. It is closely related also to another potency—which yet is not another—*imagination.*

WHAT IS IMAGINATION?

If one is seeking for a description of imagination the psychologist is almost the last man to whom to turn. Being a scientist he is eminently prosaic, as his business requires. Doubtless he can tell us much *about* imagination, how it functions, what it involves, how it is related to other psychic activities; but as for giving us any conception of the real nature of this winged gift, as well go to the printing office for a copy of Shakespeare, or to the laboratory for a human soul. It is rather to the man who *has* imagination, the poet, that we should turn for a genuine insight into its nature; although the poet

will be better able to exhibit than to analyze and interpret it.

Imagination for the psychologist is *the process by which images recur to the mind.* Thus it is closely related to memory, although memory deals with other mental recurrences beside those of images. The psychological study of imagination as the process of the recurrence of images is important, but of far greater concern is the use of imagination as an instrument for the enrichment of life. Viewed in this aspect imagination may be described as the pictorial faculty. As such it is not only a source of mental enjoyment but it is of great assistance to thought and will in accomplishing personal ends.

Professor James recognizes two forms of imagination, *productive* and *reproductive.* Adopting this distinction, let us note first some characteristics of the reproductive imagination.

REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION

Reproductive imagination repaints what we call the past. In this capacity it does far more than merely to restore past scenes and experiences and make them glow with their original colors. It exercises a selective function, dropping certain features of a given experience and

emphasizing others.[6] James M. Barrie has told us that memory is given us in order that we might have roses in December. Instead of that we use it, too often, to perpetuate frosts in June. This in itself indicates that it is no mere mechanical operation but has in it a certain freedom which witnesses to the self whose instrument it is. Imagination takes a remembered experience and invests it with fresh vividness and significance, bathes it in a "light that never was on land or sea." It does this not only for one's own past but for history, making the experience of the race—otherwise a mere mass of recorded detail—glow with color and meaning. This is not a mere fanciful and fictitious glamor but rather a discovery, aided by reflection, of meaning and value which did not fully disclose themselves at the time the experiences occurred.

There is much of artistry in this work of the imagination. Take, for example, the revivification of memories of scenes once visited. As imagination and memory unite to reproduce such a scene it stands out with a kind of immortal significance and in a framework of its own. It is as if such a scene were caught from the vast complex of space and time and held in the grasp of what philosophy has dared to call

[6] See Angell's *Introduction to Psychology.*

the *eternal,* like Keats' Grecian urn, "forever fair."

Wordsworth is the great exponent and interpreter of this office of the imagination. When the daffodils which he saw beside the lake "fluttering and dancing in the breeze" flash upon "the inward eye which is the bliss of solitude," then the heart "with rapture fills and dances with the daffodils." If you say that it takes a poet to have such an experience in recalling a beautiful sight, it may be replied that we are all poets in germ, although we cannot all write poetry. When after long anticipation the river Yarrow is at last visited the poet solaces himself for the regret of leaving so fair a scene, as follows:

> "The vapors linger round the heights,
> They melt, and soon must vanish,
> One hour is theirs, nor more is mine—
> Sad thought, which I would banish—
> But that I know, where'er I go,
> Thy genuine image, Yarrow!
> Will dwell with me—to heighten joy,
> And cheer my mind in sorrow."

John Muir is another nature lover who incites to the treasuring of happy experiences. After describing one of his exhilarating days in the

Sierra, a day filled with the joy of mountain heights, of sunlight and singing streams and cloudless skies and the companionship of trees and flowers, he closes thus: "Here ends a day that shall never end." [7] Our days of supreme enjoyment are recoverable, and thus endless, Tennyson's doleful lines on the breaking of the waves on the cold gray stones to the contrary notwithstanding. "The tender grace of a day that is dead" may come back—though the day itself may not—at the summons of memory and imagination.

CREATIVE IMAGINATION

Creative imagination has an even greater art. With a power so extraordinary as to awaken constant admiration, it takes portions of remembered scenes, events, and experiences and builds them into "most majestic visions and harmonious charmingly." Uniting with reason, imagination thus produces unified structures of ideas and imagery which appeal to all normal minds. Who does not admire the Apollo Belvedere in sculpture, St. Peter's in architecture, the Sistine Madonna in painting, or "The Tempest" in literature? Imagination thus attests itself immor-

[7] *My First Summer in the Sierra.*

tal in the character, if not in the material, of its constructions. Nor is the creative work of imagination confined to those who mold their productions into outer form. Every one who enters into the meaning of a masterpiece recreates it. To every creation of imagination that is wrought into objective form there are ten thousand that are created but not constructed. For imagination is rich in potency and lavish in artistry and to none of us is denied a share in the creative power which belongs to the very nature of selfhood.

THE CULTIVATION OF IMAGINATION

The crucial question about imagination is, how far it can be cultivated. If it is a gift not of the few but of the many, can it be developed when it exists only in faint measure? Psychology has not thus far lent much aid in this direction. Education, however, has made it quite clear that imagination is a universal human gift and that it may be, to a large degree at least, stimulated and developed. Professor Calkins regards the cultivation of the imagination as limited to the cultivation of memory,[8] but surely the former is as susceptible to devel-

[8] *A First Book in Psychology*, p. 126.

opment as the latter, for the two are not separate faculties. Art, literature, music, in which imagination finds its richest fields, are universal human interests, and the possibilities of their cultivation and enjoyment are unlimited.

Nor can the possibilities of imagination of a contrasted character be overlooked,—its subjection to fear and hatred and evil, so that it becomes an instrument of terror and dismay, a haunting limner of the imagery of ill and of noxious carrion upon which the disordered mind may feed. It is here that Religion enters as an aid. Religion is a powerful restrainer and director, as well as a fruitful stimulator and cultivator, of the imagination. In the atmosphere of its profound emotions and lofty conceptions imagination reaches its purest and highest exercise.

Chapter VI

THOUGHT

Not a few psychologists would have us scrap Rodin's statue, The Thinker. At any rate they would say: This half-human brute is not thinking, but reacting; if you think he is thinking you are doubly mistaken, because neither he thinks nor do you. Some one has suggested that, in order to accord with the trend of modern psychology, the Cartesian formula should be modified to read, instead of "I think, therefore I am," "I grope, therefore I am"; but to be more accurate still it should be: *My neural and muscular systems react; therefore I do not think; therefore I am not.*

WHAT IS THINKING

Nevertheless men think. If certain psychologists wish to think they do not think there is no need of contradicting them, unless they try to make the rest of us think we do not think. The evidence that attests the fact of thinking is—for one thing—what but psychology itself? For the instant the mind begins to examine,

unify, and relate experiences thinking has begun. Graham Wallas writes truly that "we are born with a tendency, under appropriate conditions, to think, which is as original and independent as our tendency, under appropriate conditions, to run away." [1] But running away from thought is much more popular than thinking.

What then is thinking? Is the simple taking note of the flow of experience, in which perceptions, impressions, impulses, ideas, go thronging aimlessly through the mind, thinking? In so far as there is a consecutive movement of ideas in this flow it might perhaps be termed thinking, but for the most part it is rather only passive mentalization or *psychestration.* The mind does not "sagaciate," as Uncle Remus would say, in this lazy mental process; it only runs on aimlessly and more or less fruitlessly. Thought is something more definite and significant than this.

A POPULAR ACCOUNT OF THINKING

James Harvey Robinson in his stimulating but superficial volume, *The Mind in the Making*—in which he endeavors to promote progress by maligning the past, to advance science by

[1] *The Great Society,* p. 40.

depreciating philosophy, and to further education while ignoring religion—paints a sorry picture not only of the flow of experience, which he terms *reverie,* but of human thinking in general. "The reverie," he writes, "is at all times a potent and in many cases an omnipotent rival to every other kind of thinking. It doubtless influences all our speculations in its persistent tendency to self-magnification and self-justification, which are its chief occupations." [2] Undoubtedly self-magnification and self-justification are mental operations in which we are all too often engaged. The mind runs on and on in this useless occupation unconscionably. Yet it is hardly true to say that these are the chief occupations of our daily and nightly reveries. Let us be honest with ourselves, but let us also be fair. Self-centered reverie too frequently holds us bound to a selfish revolution about ourselves; but as for being the chief theme of our meditation, there is no sufficient ground for regarding our fellows or ourselves quite so meanly as that.

Still more severe is Professor Robinson toward that form of thought which he terms *rationalizing,* which he describes as "finding arguments for going on believing as we do."

[2] *The Mind in the Making,* p. 39.

Here again our poor human nature must plead guilty. Yet it is open to question whether all our rationalizing can be brought within so sweeping a generalization as this: *"Rationalizing is the self-exculpation which occurs when we feel ourselves, or our group, accused of misapprehension or error."* [3]

Inasmuch as the only other form of thought of which Professor Robinson takes account is what he lauds as *creative thought,* which he describes as "that peculiar species of thought which leads us to *change* our mind," [4] his chapter on thinking—although it may be taken as representative of a widely prevalent attitude at the present time—can hardly be regarded as illuminating, although much that he has to say in it, and in his volume as a whole, is searching and pertinent.

THOUGHT AS THE SEARCH FOR MEANING

Thought may be defined as *the interpretation of experience.* It is engaged with *meaning.*[5]

[3] *The Mind in the Making,* p. 44.

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 49.

[5] This is of course in conflict with the *ideo-motor* theory of thought which holds that every idea immediately and automatically leads to corresponding action. But, as Professor Thorndike points out, one can think of sneezing without sneezing, or of getting out of bed in the morning without doing so.

As such it is self-directed and self-controlled mental activity. This pursuit of *meaning,* or *truth,* is one of the most eager, intense, and ineradicable traits of humanity. It is no pale pastime of over-developed minds, but one of the most human of pursuits, as essential to human welfare as the securing of food and clothing. When he ceases to think, in the sense of trying to find truth, man will cease to be man. To resolve his thinking away into the mere conquest of his environment, or the mastery of situations, is to rob him of one of his chief glories and incentives. He is here partly to find out why he is here—what life means, what the universe means, and what he himself means—and his thinking on these great themes will go on, whatever dampenings and dissuasions present-day psychology and philosophy put upon his endeavor.

This does not mean that thinking is something by itself, apart from affective and volitional activity; yet it is a distinct mental activity and assumes such forms as these:

reasoning
reflection
expression
intuition

REASONING

Reasoning is the elemental form of thought. In the dawning of intelligence it is employed for self-preservation. The so-called "trial and error" process affords an interesting study in animal intelligence. An animal is caught and placed in a trap from which the only way of escape is concealed; in an intense effort to get out it tries first this way and then that and at last hits upon the right way and escapes. In such a case little or no indication of reasoning appears. But trial and error sometimes leads to remarkable feats of intelligence, of which the following is an example:

A few weeks ago [writes Captain Oliver Pike] I was watching that small falcon, the merlin. It had got one of its legs caught in a string noose, and was struggling violently to free itself. The more it pulled the tighter got the noose, and after a few minutes it sat down, looked at its leg, and tried to see what it could do. It then caught hold of the string inside the knot and pulled, and it found that it became loose. It continued to pull, eventually opened the knot, withdrew its leg and was free. It was a difficult problem for a bird to solve, but it successfully thought it out, and performed the operation. [After citing a large number of similar instances the writer concludes:] . . . Personally, the more I study Nature, the more I am convinced

that some creatures are able to think out and solve problems for themselves.[6]

In man this problem-solving reaches a high degree of achievement by which he succeeds in handling all kinds of problems, theoretical as well as practical, from checkers to calculus, and from mechanics to politics. The problem to be solved is primarily at least a practical problem, a problem of action.

Professor John Dewey would make this relationship to action the sole and sufficient function of thought. "Deliberation," as he defines it, is "a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action. . . . It is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like. . . . Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster."[7] This is undoubtedly true of one form of thought, but to regard this as the purpose of thinking as a whole is to reach a singularly restricted account of it. Is Rodin's Thinker pondering the problem: *What am I to do?* or, rather: *What does this experience mean?* Did the pioneers of that great reflective science Astronomy ask, What am

6 "Instinct or Reason?" *Psyche,* October, 1921, pp. 123, 126.
7 *Human Nature and Conduct,* p. 190.

I to do about the stars? or rather, What are these heavenly bodies, and by what laws are they controlled? Was Plato, who admittedly did some thinking, primarily concerned with problems of how to get his bread and butter, or how to get the better of his fellow philosophers, or rather with how to understand the world of nature and human nature and the intuitions and intimations of a realm of universals without which he could not satisfy his mind? His thought was primarily not instrumental but reflective and humanity has cherished it as of inestimable worth.[8]

REFLECTION, EXPRESSION, INTUITION

Reflection is directly engaged with the problem, not of action, but of meaning. What does this experience, this phenomenon, this fact, *mean?* How is it related to other facts and experiences, and ultimately, to the whole of things? The detection of *relationships* is a large

[8] This attitude of mind Plato gained from, or attributed to, Socrates, who in the *Meno* declares: "We shall be better and braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to inquire, than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing and no use in searching after what we know not:—that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight in word and deed, to the utmost of my power."

part of the work of reflection and is of the utmost practical service,[9] yet reflection is not confined to this, but passes on to the wider task of discovering a comprehensive and unified world. It makes use of *concepts* and *ideas* which gather up and hold the results of previous reflection in condensed and convenient forms. Concepts and ideas are knowledge tabloids. Words are the symbols of concepts and ideas, by means of which they may be coördinated and communicated. Grammar consists of the codified rules for the use of words. Logic consists of the rational principles for the use of ideas.

Reflection, like reasoning, is thus a most essential function of thought. It is true that it is attended by a kind of mental disease, which may be termed *intellectualitis*—a form of intellectual dry-rot to which professors, scientists, specialists, and theorists of all sorts are peculiarly susceptible, and from which few mortals are immune. That which Robinson calls "rationalizing" is but one form of this malady. It consists of concentration upon ideas, theories, and abstractions, with a corresponding loss of emotional activity, human interest, and power

[9] See James Drever, *The Psychology of Everyday Life*, pp. 130 ff.

of action. Its frequency and folly have caused an unfortunate reaction against the normal intellection which is essential to the life of the mind. But because reflection is subject to abuse is no reason why it is not in itself both normal and essential.

When meaning is in some sort deciphered, thought takes the form of *expression.* It asks: How can this truth, this meaning, be expressed, embodied, communicated? Language is the primary expression of thought, but in itself alone it is too limited. Thus arise the arts—literature, music, architecture, sculpture, painting. These all, by the use of imagination, seek to express meanings in one form or another. The arts are not predominantly intellectual, but they all embody ideas. They are the expressions of thought quite as much as of emotion.

The highest form of thought is *intuition,* the direct beholding of truth. Intuition is not dreaming but *vision.* It is both receptive and active. When united with reflection it is contemplation. The truth beheld by intuition is primarily personal, spiritual truth, the knowledge of persons—oneself, one's fellows, God. It is engaged with the good, the true, and the beautiful—qualities which have no meaning detached from personality.

In its reciprocal, mutual character intuition becomes communion, fellowship. It is thus the pathway to the highest knowledge, which is love.

Chapter VII

THE KNOWLEDGE OF OTHERS

How does one self know another? It seems a needless academic question, and perhaps it would be if its answer did not involve the sense of reality and of value which we attach to each other. It is now almost a commonplace that we never see or hear or touch each other. How, then, do we know each other?

DO WE KNOW EACH OTHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY?

If we say, with an impersonal philosophy, as well as with an unreflective common sense, that our knowledge of each other is a knowledge by inference only, or by analogy, we create a gulf between others and ourselves, which, artificial though it may be, helps to keep us asunder. If when I see a human form or hear a voice I then say to myself, there must be an I, a self, whose body this is; and if the existence of others is known to me only in this way, their bodies will be sufficiently real but they themselves will seem somewhat faint and nebulous. I cannot

know *you* in this roundabout way, but only facts about you.

If our knowledge of each other were of this secondary indirect sort, it would be of the same order as our knowledge of objects. We would thus appear to be bodies having souls, rather than souls having bodies, dependent upon the senses for that knowledge which is of chief concern, the knowledge of each other. It may be that this is the only way we can know each other, but it is not an assumption to go unchallenged.

If, on the other hand, we know each other directly, in an intercourse which is personal in character, there is a certainty and worthwhileness about such knowledge which heightens its value and harmonizes with our sense of its relative importance. Let us see if there are reasons for holding that our knowledge of each other is of this personal and immediate kind. We certainly know *ourselves* by an immediate and unquestioning knowledge. Do we know each other in the same way?

KNOWLEDGE OF OTHERS OF THE SAME NATURE AS KNOWLEDGE OF OURSELVES

The first reason for holding that our knowledge of other selves is of the same order as our

knowledge of ourselves is that *one's consciousness of his own selfhood arises in the presence of other selves and apparently could not arise otherwise.* We do not know ourselves by looking in the mirror, nor do we know our friend simply by looking at and listening to him. There is something deeper and more intimate than this. We look within ourselves to know ourselves, we look within others to know them.

"Aren't you glad that you are my little girl?" said a fond father to his child. "I'm not your little girl; I'm my own," was the quick reply. Here was a defining of self over against another self, the knowledge of each necessary to the other. It would be a clumsy process if this father's knowledge of his child and hers of him were primarily inferential, rather than experiential. Had they not been for years finding each other in the mental, moral, and spiritual contacts of daily life? If, as the result of her own coming to selfhood through this and various other personal impacts, the little girl refused to admit her father's ownership in order to be true to her own selfhood, this would not necessarily mean that she failed to recognize the relationship—except as his question seemed to ignore her own selfhood. Very closely do we

revolve about one another without losing our selfhood in each other.

KNOWLEDGE OF OTHERS NOT CONSCIOUSLY INFERENTIAL

A second reason for holding that our knowledge of other selves is more than merely inferential is that *we are conscious of no process of inference from bodies to selves inhabiting them.* It is easy to say that the induction from the body of another to his selfhood is so swift and familiar as to be unconscious, just as the process of forming concepts from percepts is ordinarily unconscious. But the object of our personal knowledge is not something objective in space, but another self.

> Immediacy in this connection simply means that when the act of discrimination is directed upon a mind then what we apprehend is a mind and not something that intervenes between us and it.[1]

The knowledge we have of each other is not abstract and general but concrete and individual. In recognizing another person I do not say, "This is a self"—for that is a defining act, requiring a process of reflection. I say, "This is

[1] Mrs. Natalie A. Duddington, *Mind,* April, 1921, p. 195.

you, whom I have learned to know by personal interchange, or *you* whom I know only as a stranger, but whom I at once recognize as a kindred being, a concrete individual self."

THE SLIGHTNESS OF THE MEDIUM NEEDED FOR COMMUNICATION

A third reason for holding that we know each other by personal means, rather than by objective inference, is that *our intercourse with each other is often so nearly independent of a material medium.* How slight and inconsiderable a thread of mutuality is required upon which one mind may run out to another! A word, an eye glance, an inflection of the voice, and two selves come into perfect understanding of each other. Yet even this is not necessary. They may be thousands of miles apart and a few pen marks on a piece of paper serve to make them one in mind and heart. You may point to the absolute necessity of *some* means of communication, however slight, but the importance attaches not to the means but to the minds that can by so slight an agency reach each other.

It seems indeed as if at times certain unusually sensitive persons, who are in complete *rapport,* succeed in communicating with each other with-

out any material medium at all. The evidence in favor of telepathy seems to the layman decidedly strong, however insufficient for the orthodox psychologist. And yet it is best, perhaps, that telepathy, if it exists at all, is so rare and exceptional. We are not yet morally and spiritually fit for such ease and swiftness of intercommunication. But even if some means, however tenuous, is essential to personal converse, the significant fact, I repeat, is that it *is* a means and in itself is so trivial, compared with the selves who employ it.

RECOGNITION

What then shall we term this knowledge we have of each other as selves? Let us call it *recognition,* a knowledge that makes use of means, yet transcends and overflows them and goes through them to its object. The power of recognition is like a swift current of water flowing down a hillside and, finding a little depression that serves for a channel, follows it, fills it, overflows it, deepens it into a river bed, and hastens through it to the sea. We are like isolated beings trying to find and know each other, and we seize every clew and avenue that will lead us toward one another. But when we find

each other the clew ceases to be of any worth.

Yet if it be granted that our knowledge of each other is primarily a knowledge of recognition, still the means by which this knowledge is deepened and extended become as such a matter of the greatest interest. Here are we, distinct selves, in separate bodies, and in a world at once akin and alien to ourselves—how are we to understand each other?

The signal fact, which is so common that we do not appreciate its real wonder and significance, is the ease with which we succeed, by means of the several vehicles of expression in our possession, in exchanging our thoughts, emotions, and desires. Tennyson, in his searching poem *De Profundis,* terms the body "this fleshly sign that thou art thou." This major sign of selfhood possesses a complete code of minor signs by which the self communicates itself to other selves. Let us dwell a little upon some of them.

FACE, VOICE, AND SPEECH AS SELF-REVELATIONS

The human face is a marvelous index of the self whose mirror it is, with its changing expressions, its lights and shadows, its gleams and glooms, its swift and subtle disclosures of what

is passing within. Its sensitiveness and its mobility give it an extraordinary power of reflecting thought, emotion, and intention. We become surprisingly quick and keen in reading these signs. The slightest change of countenance furnishes a key to thoughts and emotions which lie too deep for words. It is true that one may to a degree control his facial expression so as to conceal what is going on within, but this is more or less strained and abnormal. The American Indian and the Oriental have practiced for generations the art of concealing their real feelings and thoughts and with remarkable results; but the success is only partial at best. The eye is an especially responsive revealer of inner thoughts and feelings and may betray what the rest of the countenance hides. Yet when the relations between persons are true and pure, and thoughts and motives are kind and generous, there is no need of covering this beautiful mirror of facial expression by which we read one another's minds and hearts. When souls are in sincere and trustful inner harmony, the flashes from face to face convey mutual understandings and harmonies swift and pure as light. "Then I turned my eyes unto the beautiful eyes," wrote Dante of Beatrice, and in those eyes he found a transcript not only of her

mind but of that of her God, and a better understanding of his own thought also.

What has been said of the face as an index and revealer of selfhood is hardly less true of the voice. By reason of its individual quality, its flexibility, its capacity for harshness and tenderness, sympathy and indifference, the voice reveals not only the habitual self, with its own unique individuality, but also one's changing moods and tempers, his elations and depressions, his victories and defeats, his joys and sorrows. To know another's voice is to know much more than his voice. It is to know something of himself; and to detect the changes in his tone is to have a key to his physical and mental moods.

Finally, there is language, slow and labored compared with the sign-code of which we have been speaking, yet with marvelous powers of its own. It is only the lethargy and paralysis of familiarity which withholds our admiration of this racial achievement of a medium of communication by means of which we share the inner wealth of our common yet individual experience. When shall we become wise enough to wonder?

To know God and each other increasingly, by means of, and beyond, the varied media of our communicated experience—and thus to

grow constantly into completer personality and completer intercourse, human and divine—this is life indeed.

THE NEED AND POSSIBILITY OF A COMPLETER POWER OF EXPRESSION

And yet, when all has been said in praise of the body, with its delicate and mobile adaptations, as an instrument of personal expression and communion, the final word to be spoken of it is of its comparative inadequacy. It is as imperfect as it is wonderful. How often it fails us in giving expression to what is within! In most men their best, most original, most individual thought and feeling goes unexpressed, uncommunicated, or but partially so. For we are dumb creatures, after all, when it comes to our deepest thoughts and dreams and purposes. Babble and prattle as we may, the best lies locked within. So, it is true, does the worst; but that does not call for expression—except it be in confession—and had best die of inanition, formless and void.

A completer knowledge of each other in a completer state of self-development and of mutual communion—this is no mere ideal of religious sentimentalism but the normal promise

and outcome of present unrealized possibilities and capacities. For in this we groan, being burdened, not that we would be unclothed, losing such powers of expression and communion as we have, but clothed upon with larger, completer potencies of fellowship, that what is mortal may be swallowed up of life.

Chapter VIII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALITY

"I begin to think," wrote George Tyrrell in one of his letters, "that the only real sin is suicide, or not being one's self." He who has integrity, humility and aspiration is morally certain not only to escape this form of suicide but also to be a progressively developing person. Indeed these qualities themselves evidence a considerable stage of personal development. Yet they are preparative, not perfective. There must be an active outreach toward the ideal and active forthputting of creative powers. The receptive spirit which inheres in true personality is subsidiary to the active energizing by the exercise of which the person develops his most distinctive and original powers through giving himself to others.

SELF-DEVELOPMENT AND FREEDOM

Self-development involves freedom, the denial of which—open or self-concealed—is characteristic of most of the new psychology. This de-

nial, anticipated by Hobbes, has become familiar in the forms of determinism now in vogue. In the issue between the new psychology and ethics thus created the conclusive appeal for the reality of freedom is to *experience*. Here it may be left with entire assurance. For, to recur to John Laird's affirmation, "If anything can claim to be an experience, choice certainly can." It is quite true, as psychology has shown, that we sometimes imagine an experience which we do not have. But such false suppositions are in time corrected by further experience. This one is not. It holds, in spite of all attempts at refutation.

Freedom as experienced is more than a consciousness. It is a pragmatic consciousness. The consciousness is ratified in results. It is confirmed in what issues from conscious action. We know ourselves, that is, to be *creative*. The witness lies not only in consciousness but in the works that we do. There they stand, in wood, stone, color, printed page, or what not, *ours,* testifying to our creative deed. *Creation* is the greater act of freedom and proves the lesser, *choice*. Yet, greater than creativeness in the external environment is the *inner creativeness* by which we make ourselves other than we were.

The active energizing of personality, by

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means of which we shape ourselves into unique persons, may be summarized as consisting of self-restraint, self-expression, and self-giving.

SELF-RESTRAINT

Ethical standards alter in form, if not in substance, in our rapidly moving age. Accepted canons and rules of conduct change almost in a night. Impatience with accepted moral standards shows itself everywhere. One of these is a marked disrespect for self-restraint. Our fathers and mothers were people of self-control, at least some of them were, and the rest acknowledged that they ought to be. To-day self-restraint is too largely a despised virtue. There is a very widespread notion that whenever one has an idea, or an inclination, or a suggestion, the thing to do is to "out with it" in all its raw and ill-dressed crudity. Fustian fashions are set aside, like old-time carriages and chaises. It is an age of indulgence "when virtue's steely bones look bleak in the cold wind." "Speak what is in your mind, do what you like!" whispers the *Zeitgeist* to youth, and when it whispers low "Thou mayst" the youth replies "Sure!" The effect of this removal of self-restraint upon personality is supposed to be releasing and expan-

sive. At least it brings—so it is supposed—relief from the weariness and dullness of old-fashioned conventionalities. And who cares for *them* any longer? Therefore if you want to say something, say it; if you want to do something, do it. If you want to explode, explode; it will do you good. One may parody this prevalent notion thus (with apologies to Francis Thompson):

> And when so mad thou canst not madder,
> Swear! and upon thy so sore soul
> Will dawn the pleasure of a marked reaction,
> Yet with the consciousness, "I've been a fool."

The mischief of all this is the more subtle because psychology is supposed to sanction it. Only get the poison well out of your system, it is said, and you will be at ease. True, if you really get it out. But that is just what this method does not do. It is good psychology that to nurse an ill feeling strengthens it; it is equally good psychology that to vociferate it inflates it. To talk about a grudge deepens it. The man who swears over his present scrape is so much more liable to swear over the next. As the wiser psychologists tell us, the best way to get rid of a wrong feeling is not to fight it but to put a good one in its place. "Crump,

with his grunting resistance to his native devils," does not lay them. He had better seek angels to dispossess them. "Inhibition by substitution," as Professor James put it, is the strategic and successful principle. But that calls for self-restraint, not for self-explosion. One must count ten while he is beckoning to the good spirits.

The evil of unrestrained speech and action is that it is disruptive. It blows the unity of selfhood to fragments. It knocks down the house of habit which one has built for himself with much labor and pains, and compels him to repair if not to reconstruct it before he can be at home with himself again. One who is building a "spiritual habitation," as Paul calls it, cannot afford to put dynamite under it every few minutes. Edward A. Steiner writes of a certain Scotchman, "When sober he was as noble as a knight . . . when drunk he slipped back a thousand years and all his lawless ancestors (and their name was legion) took possession of him."

It is a happy fact that one is able to tell, whether by some inward monitor, or ingrained canons of instruction, or however, when he is in a wrong state of mind. How shall he correct it? Not by giving way to it, not by striking

when he feels like striking, not by swearing when he feels like swearing, not by crying when he feels like crying, nor yet by fighting it as if it were a devil which he must evict by moral struggle. The better way is "inhibition by substitution." Instead of self-explosion, self-restraint; instead of going to pieces let one hold himself together; instead of exhibition, inhibition; instead of giving vent to bad feeling, substituting good feeling.

SELF-EXPRESSION

Over against self-restraint, as its counterpart, lies self-expression, the positive exercise of selfhood for which self-restraint is a condition and preparative. The possibility and range of self-expression lie in that power of creativeness which we have adduced as one of the chief prerogatives of selfhood. To a certain degree we fashion both ourselves and our environment. Our endowment is a given factor yet it is to a large extent plastic, mobile, susceptible to the molding of will and purpose. Our environment, too, is in part responsive to our touch, ready to be shaped into forms of beauty and utility that reflect the life within. Hence the possibility of self-expression, and with the possibil-

ity, since we are moral beings, the *duty. Thou shalt express, create, mirror thyself in thine own character and deeds and in the world about thee!* Such an obligation rests, as a sacred mandate of our selfhood, upon each of us. As we fulfill it our personality becomes a vital, outgoing, productive force in the personal world, conveying itself in its own unique manner to a circle of selves who are helped and enriched by it.[1] It is in its emphasis upon self-expression that the new education, receiving its impetus largely from the new psychology, is accomplishing its chief service. But this service will be vitiated unless self-expression is balanced by discipline and self-restraint.

Here, too, enters the danger attending the use of intelligence tests which the new psychology has bequeathed to education. The intelligence test has become a test of the intelligence of its employers quite as much as of those upon whom it is employed. Unless it is used with reservation and discrimination it is likely to result in such consequences as Walter Lippmann has pointed out in his articles, "The Abuse of the Intelligence Test," in *The New Republic.*

1 "Our appreciation of the great masterpieces of the world's art in large part hinges upon the *personality* of their creators." A. A. Roback, *Behaviorism and Psychology,* p. 112.

The implication of determinism which attends the intelligence test is too easily overlooked.

Readers who have not examined the literature of mental testing may wonder why there is reason to fear such an abuse of an invention which has many practical uses. The answer, I think, is that most of the more prominent testers have committed themselves to a dogma which must lead to just such abuse. They claim not only that they are really measuring intelligence, but that intelligence is innate, hereditary and determined. They believe that they are measuring the capacity of a human being for all time and that this capacity is fatally fixed by the child's heredity. Intelligence testing in the hands of men who hold this dogma could not but lead to an intellectual caste system in which the task of education had given way to the doctrine of predestination and infant damnation.[2]

Add to this the liability that intelligence shall be identified with mere practical alertness and retentiveness of memory, thus ignoring the poetic, philosophic, meditative, artistic forms of intelligence, and the pitfalls increase. One wonders how well Plato, Dante, Bunyan, Shelley, or Hawthorne would have passed the intelligence tests. In a trenchant article entitled "Educational Determinism" Professor W. C. Bagley challenges the statement of L. M. Terman that

[2] *The New Republic,* November 15, 1922, p. 297.

"facts have been presented which show that the limits of a child's educability can be fairly predicted by means of mental tests in the first school year" as follows: "I submit that the facts are not yet all in with respect to this crucial problem which the determinist has essayed to solve out of hand and almost overnight, and I further submit that hypotheses based on so confused a mass of facts as those already available should be held in abeyance were they ten times as plausible as are the determined theories of to-day." [3]

SELF-GIVING

Self-expression finds its fulfillment in *self-giving*. Communicative and outgoing as it is, self-expression may be self-centered and deformed unless it has the motive and impulse of self-impartation, dedication to the common good. Self-giving is the heart and essence of love—not the passion to possess, but the passion to impart. This of course involves sympathy, fellow-feeling, else one will not enter into another's need nor exert his capacity to share.[4] The aim of the individual self should be, not his own

[3] *School and Society*, April 8, 1922.

[4] For an incomparable description of love see the final chapters of Professor George Herbert Palmer's *Altruism*.

personal development merely, but his own and that of all others.

Various attempts have been made to formulate this principle and give it adequate expression. Perhaps none is better than that of Felix Adler: "So act as to elicit the unique personality in others and thereby in yourself." Or as Mr. Hooker in Dr. Jacks' *The Legends of Smoke-over* put it: "The true and final business of every man is to affirm his own personality, but always in such a way as to help others to affirm theirs." The implications and applications of such a principle are many and varied. Certainly we should not miss its application to social and industrial conditions. To act so as to elicit the personality of others means, for one thing, to act so as to create the conditions of living under which their personalities may develop. Yet to stop with the personalizing of social conditions would be to miss the heart and soul of the whole matter. For it is the personal touch, the contact of person with person, directly and within the group, which counts most, and through which we shall approach nearer and nearer to that state of individual and social well-being in which each is for all and all for each.

PART II: SELFLESS PSYCHOLOGY

Part II: Selfless Psychology

Chapter IX

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HABIT AND IMPULSE

Contrasted with a psychology which keeps the self at the center are the various forms of current psychology which either ignore or directly deny personality. It is impossible to overlook the challenge which this selfless psychology offers to those who hold that personality is not only the chief value but the central reality of existence. The following discussion of the new psychology is confined to this one aspect of it and with no intention, as has before been stated, of disparaging its important contributions to the knowledge of mental processes and human conduct. We are concerned here not with the affirmations of the new psychology but with its negations.

The first form of a professedly selfless psychology to engage us may well be one that is closely linked with one of the leading philoso-

phies of the day, Professor John Dewey's *Instrumentalism.*

HABITS AND IMPULSES

If one would understand the forces which are molding present thought, he cannot afford to overlook the influence of John Dewey. Not only in philosophy and ethics but also in psychology his virile and fearless thinking is making itself felt in increasing measure. In all of his writing there is a definite and forceful insistence upon a long-neglected principle, i.e., *the application of thinking to conduct.* This is in many respects a releasing and progressive truth. Yet on account of its one-sidedness it is inimical to principles and ideals which have been won at great cost, the loss of which means divergence from the path of real progress.

In none of Professor Dewey's utterances is there a more vigorous and effective statement of this principle than in his lectures at Stanford University published in 1922, entitled, *Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology.* In this penetrative study of human nature Professor Dewey finds the clew to the individual human being in *the adjustment of his habits and impulses through the directing*

agency of intelligence. In this process the self disappears from sight.

The doctrine of a single, simple and indissoluble soul was the cause and the effect of failure to recognize that concrete habits are the means of knowledge and thought. . . . Now it is dogmatically stated that no such conception of the seat, agent or vehicle will go psychologically at the present time. Concrete habits do all the perceiving, recognizing, imagining, recalling, judging, conceiving, and reasoning that is done. "Consciousness," whether as a stream or as special sensations and images, expresses functions of habits, phenomena of their formation, operation, their interruption and reorganization.

Yet habit does not, of itself, know, for it does not of itself stop to think, observe or remember. Neither does impulse of itself engage in reflection or contemplation. It just lets go. Habits by themselves are too organized, too insistent and determinate to need to indulge in inquiry or imagination. And impulses are too chaotic, tumultuous and confused to be able to know even if they wanted to. Habit as such is too definitely adapted to an environment to survey or analyze it, and impulse is too indeterminately related to the environment to be capable of reporting anything about it. Habit incorporates, enacts or overrides objects, but it doesn't know them. Impulse scatters and obliterates them with its restless stir. A certain delicate combination of habit and impulse is requisite for observation, memory and judgment. Knowledge which is not pro-

jected against the black unknown lives in the muscles, not in consciousness.[1]

THE OFFICE OF THOUGHT

Although unthinking habit and impulse thus appear to be the main factors in forming conduct, it is not with Professor Dewey's approbation. "We may indeed safely start," he says, "from the assumption that impulse and habit, not thought, are the primary determinants of conduct. But the conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that the need is therefore the greater for cultivation of thought." [2]

The office of thought is not, however, in his judgment,[3] to discover and appropriate ends, but to regulate desires.

The intellect is always inspired by some impulse. Even the most case-hardened specialist, the most abstract philosopher, is moved by some passion. But an actuating impulse easily hardens into isolated habit. It is unavowed and disconnected. The remedy is not lapse of thought, but its quickening and extension to contemplate the continuities of existence, and restore the connection of the isolated desire to the companionship of its fellows.[4]

[1] Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 176, 177
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 222.
[3] See *supra*, p. 83.
[4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 258, 259.

In this revised and improved Epicureanism, as in original Epicureanism, personality is subordinated to the passing experience.

The objection to Epicureanism lies in its conception of what constitutes present good, not in its emphasis upon satisfaction as at present. The same remark may be made about every theory which recognizes the individual self. If any such theory is objectionable, the objection is against the character or quality assigned to the self. Of course an individual is the bearer or carrier of experience. What of that? Everything depends upon the kind of experience that centers in him. Not the residence of experience counts, but its contents, what's in the house. The center is not in the abstract amenable to our control, but what gathers about it is our affair. We can't help being individual selves, each one of us. If selfhood as such is a bad thing, the blame lies not with the self but with the universe, with providence. But in fact the distinction between a selfishness with which we find fault and an unselfishness which we esteem is found in the quality of the activities which proceed from and enter into the self, according as they are contractive, exclusive, or expansive, outreaching. Meaning exists for some self, but this truistic fact doesn't fix the quality of any particular meaning. It may be such as to make the self small, or such as to exalt and dignify the self. It is as impertinent to decry the worth of experience because it is connected with a self as it is fantastic to idealize personality just as personality aside from the question what sort of a person one is.[5]

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 292, 293.

EXPERIENCE VS. SELFHOOD

Here is an issue, clearly and distinctly drawn. Is *experience* the primary reality and the ultimate value, or, *the self who experiences?* To Professor Dewey it is clearly *experience*. He recognizes the individual as the *bearer* or carrier of experience, and then questions, "What of that?" The answer is: Even if this were all that the individual is, a bearer of experience, it would mean much. A river is the bearer of water. What of that? All the difference between the Nile and the Rhine, the Hudson and the Mississippi. The animal is a bearer of the life-force. What of that? All the difference between the tiger and the lamb. Individualized experience means much, even in the realm of nature. But in humanity it means more, vastly more. *It is the individual bearer of experience who gives to the experience its character and significance.* The significant fact is not so much the experience as the fact that the experience comes to consciousness, has poignancy and meaning for an individual self.

How the individual self came to be, is a problem which Professor Dewey would say is better side-stepped than solved. It may be so, although such evasion of an urgent issue is a poor

exemplification of the principle of adventure of which he makes so much. But, whatever may have been his source, *the self is here.* Without him there would be no thinking, no intelligent behavior, no social relationships. Without him experience itself would not be realized experience. It would be only such experience as the animal has, instinctive, unreflective, incommunicable.

The fact that *an experience comes home to a self*—to you and me and the other man—is that which gives it meaning. And yet that is less than half of its significance. The major fact is that *experience is molded, interpreted, individualized by each self so as to become his own.* Each of us shapes his experience by means not of thought only, but of *will,* a term which has no meaning for Dewey except that of a set of habits.

> All habits are demands for certain kinds of activity; and they constitute the self. In any intelligible sense of the word will, they *are* will.[6]

To magnify experience at the expense of selfhood is to nullify experience itself. For if we experience *anything* we experience *selfhood.* That is the very core and center of experience,

[6] *Op. cit.,* p. 25.

—the consciousness of an I, to whom experience comes as to *one hit by it,* concerned with it, able to transform it into his own substance and give it meaning.[7]

It is true that the individual self may, in a given instance, be a very mean and worthless human unit, negligible and insignificant, *except* in potentiality. Yet in this potentiality lies a hidden spark of reality and worth which Professor Dewey appears to overlook. When the self, by means of the power of thought and will, takes control of impulse and habit so as to shape them, however imperfectly, in conformity to an ideal, there results that value of values, that ultimate reality in whom experience becomes transvalued, the *person.*

THE INSTRUMENTALIST'S INCONSISTENCY

Yet it would be unjust to Professor Dewey to overlook the tunic of idealism which he still wears beneath the outer garments of his loose and ill-fitting empiricism, and which no amount of protest on his part can succeed in concealing. When he turns from the confused and hopeless world of meaningless struggle and aimless progress, which he has, in part at least, conjured up,

[7] Cf. J. W. Buckham: *Religion as Experience,* Chapter I.

to the remembrance that "in the midst of effort to foresee and regulate future objects we are sustained and expanded in feebleness and failure by the sense of an enveloping whole," he reveals the spirit of philosophic calm which broods over the seething ocean of his formless opportunism. The concluding pages of his volume might indeed have been written by that profound exponent of the philosophic whole whose philosophy he totally rejects, Josiah Royce. Take, e.g., the following paragraph:

> Within the flickering inconsequential acts of separate selves dwells a sense of the whole which calms and dignifies them. In its presence we put off mortality and live in the universal. The life of the community in which we live and have our being is the fit symbol of this relationship. The acts in which we express our perception of the ties which bind us to others are its only rites and ceremonies.[8]

What is this *whole,* the thought of which gives strength and calm in the midst of struggle and defeat? What but the Great Community, and the environing universe? as Professor Dewey himself more than hints when he writes: "Infinite relationships of man with his fellows and with nature already exist. The ideal means, as

[8] Op. cit., pp. 331, 332.

we have seen, a sense of these encompassing continuities with their infinite reach. . . . Even in the midst of conflict, struggle and defeat a consciousness is possible of the enduring and comprehending whole." [9]

It would be difficult to find a more striking instance of inconsistency than this professed pragmatist's ejection of personal value in the form of individual selfhood only to bring it back under the guise of the social whole. A psychology of habits and impulses, dominated by deliberation, itself becomes meaningless apart from individual selfhood and a society of selves.

[9] Cf. J. W. Buckham: *Religion as Experience,* p. 330.

Chapter X

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INSTINCTS

The emphasis upon the instincts which characterizes present-day psychology is so recent as to call for careful scrutiny before accepting it as final. James Ward does not use the term in his article, "Psychology," in the *Encyclopedia Britannica;* nor does G. F. Stout in his *Manual of Psychology* (1904). William James devotes a chapter to "Instincts" in his shorter *Psychology* (1910), but it is chiefly taken up with the instincts of animals. This simply indicates how new the instinct psychology is. That is nothing against it, except that it has not had the test of time.

The emergence of the instincts in psychology is due to the study of animal psychology and biology. It would be folly to fail to recognize the light thrown by this study upon the working of the human mind, although in the fascination of the pursuit it is easy to minimize the vast difference between the animal mind and the human mind.

THE INSTINCTS CLASSIFIED

What is an instinct? Professor William McDougall's definition, which has become almost a classic in contemporary psychology, is as follows: "An inherited or innate psychophysical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action." [1]

With the instincts, according to Dr. McDougall, are closely linked the *emotions*. The excitement of an instinct always has an "affective aspect." This "affective aspect" is an emotion.[2] To complete the scheme there are added the *sentiments*. A sentiment is "an organized system of emotional tendencies centered about some object." [3]

The seven primary instincts and their accompanying emotions, according to McDougall, are as follows: the instinct of flight and the emotion of fear, the instinct of repulsion and the emotion of disgust, the instinct of curiosity

[1] *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 29 (Eighth Edition).
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 46.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 122.

and the emotion of wonder, the instinct of pugnacity and the emotion of anger, the instinct of self-abasement and the emotion of subjection, the instinct of self-assertion and the emotion of elation, the parental instinct and the tender emotion. The leading sentiments are love and hate. Love (as shown by a diagram) is made up of such instincts as pugnacity, curiosity, subjection, self-assertion, and, most of all, the parental instinct. Hate combines repulsion with various other instincts.

This description of the instincts and emotions is extremely clearly drawn and ingenious. But is it valid? I find myself sharing the judgment of Professor Hobhouse when he says: "Reason and will are with us as hereditary as any capacity to feel or any tendency to physical or mental response to special stimulus, and it is a mistake to found psychology on a row of separate instincts that may be variously combined." [4]

This tabulation and treatment of mental factors is greatly altered and enlarged in Professor McDougall's later volume, *Outline of Psychology* (1923). The catalogue of instincts, which are here defined as "directed conative trends," is increased to fourteen and includes the in-

[4] *Development and Purpose*, p. 59.

stincts of appeal, food-seeking, and laughter which are not found in the earlier volume.

The emotions are much less closely attached to the instincts and are divided into *primary* and *derived* emotions. The latter "are not constantly correlated with any one impulse or tendency, but rather may arise in the course of the operation of any strong impulse or tendency." [5] The sentiments, or "*acquired* conative trends" are given a far more appreciative and suggestive treatment, and full recognition is accorded to the moral sentiments (e.g., love of justice, or of truth) which are defined as "real concrete sentiments for abstract objects." [6]

And yet, as (e.g.) in the analysis of love, nothing is recognized beyond the blending of emotions arising out of primary instincts and impulses. Nothing is here that could be properly termed *altruism,* or self-forgetfulness—the love that "seeketh not its own."

Whether to regard these great human sentiments, by virtue of which we live together as persons, as "acquired conative trends" or as the attitudes of moral selves toward life and toward one another comes nearest to their real nature depends upon whether the ultimate truth con-

[5] *Outline of Psychology,* p. 338.

[6] *Ibid.,* p. 435. This is a somewhat arbitrary distinction, for sentiments toward persons are certainly *moral* also.

cerning the mind lies with psychology or with philosophy.

One cannot but regard this refined and amplified psychological *schema* of Professor McDougall with the highest admiration. He has broken avowedly and completely with the mechanistic psychology.[7] He has found a place in his system for the cherished *principia* of the older psychology—reason, character, belief—everything but the operation of a Divine Mind upon the human. He has in fact rationalized, ethicized and spiritualized his psychology to the utmost possible extent that it will bear. And yet, it remains virtually a selfless psychology, for the reason that it conceives man as a creature of animal instincts and no more. The key to his nature is not spiritual but physical.[8]

A CRITICISM OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INSTINCTS

There can be no doubt of the presence and power of instincts in the human organism. Yet

[7] See the Preface and Introduction of his *Outline of Psychology.*

[8] I find this judgment of McDougall supported by A. A. Roback, who says: "McDougall's renouncement of his earlier definition of psychology takes him out of the behaviorist class entirely, and yet his psychological system has not changed notwithstanding this revision" (*Behaviorism and Psychology,* p. 269).

one must ask (1) what transformations they may have undergone, (2) whether some of the animal instincts have not been practically sloughed off, and (3) whether the instincts are not subordinate to other and greater powers which have entered to control if not to supersede them.

It can hardly be questioned that the instincts, as they become more and more humanized, suffer a sea change and take on qualities that differ from their originals as much as the face of a refined man or woman differs from that of an ape or a chimpanzee. None of us but knows persons in whom curiosity, for example, if it still lingers, has been transformed into an intelligent and humane interest which no more resembles primitive curiosity than white resembles black. It must be added that in other human beings curiosity has been degraded far below animal curiosity. In both cases, however, humanization has transformed the instinct. This raises the question whether some at least of the animal instincts are not sloughed off entirely in the human stage [9] of the evolutionary process. Was there any pugnacity, for example, in Gen-

[9] "The fact is that man is not merely an animal with certain additional qualities, he is something else. . . . How many instincts have we that last?" Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life,* p. 66.

eral Grant or General Lee? If there was, it was not *that* that made them great generals, but a cool, intelligent determination that bears little or no resemblance to animal pugnacity.

The psychology of the instincts too far ignores these contrasts between animal and man. But its greatest defect is its failure to reckon with factors in human nature which govern or supplant instincts. There, for instance, are *motives,* or, as McDougall would call them, *intentions.* It is a deficient psychology which makes no place for motive. Motives are not instincts, nor are they emotions, although they involve these, but *accepted incentives to conscious ends.* Motives may be more or less rational; that is, the end sought may be either the satisfaction of an appetite or instinct, or the higher good of oneself or of others. They are, however, intelligent; for there is always an end in view. An animal never has a motive, a man is never without one. When an animal goes hunting he goes in obedience to an instinct. When a man goes hunting he goes because of a motive—in order to satisfy his love of the chase, or that he may get food with which to satisfy his appetite—or perhaps both. In other words, man knows *why* he goes hunting, the animal does not. It is useless to try to obliter-

ate this distinction. The man can explain to himself and his fellows what he is going to do and why, the animal cannot.

It is questionable, too, to link *emotion* so exclusively with instinct as the psychologists of this school do. As Mr. A. F. S. Shand has pointed out, an instinct may be excited without involving an emotion.[10] Men fight sometimes, as Mr. Shand says, with no feeling of anger whatever. Moreover an emotion may be stirred apart from the reaction of an instinct. Thought, e.g., is accompanied by emotion, usually subdued, but capable of becoming intense, as when Malebranche experienced "violent palpitations of the heart" in reading Descartes' *Traité de l'Homme*.[11]

INSTINCT PSYCHOLOGY AS MECHANICAL AS FACULTY PSYCHOLOGY

The degree of elaboration with which the instincts, impulses, emotions and sentiments have been analyzed and combined by McDougall, and also by Shand, awakens the suspicion, as Lloyd Morgan points out,[12] that we have here

[10] *The Foundations of Character*, pp. 189, 190.

[11] See Ribot, *The Psychology of the Emotions*, p. 110 (Second Edition).

[12] *Instinct and Experience*, p. 118.

a repetition of the mechanism of the faculty psychology. Instincts are capable of as mechanical a treatment on the part of psychology as were the faculties. These instincts of ours are not a set of automata operating within us, singly or in combination. It is *we* who have instincts and emotions, not they that have us. There is in the instinct psychology an academic adjustment of concepts, a schematism, a disposing of difficulties to conform to a system, which fails to carry conviction. The "binary" and "tertiary" and still more complex combinations of instincts and emotions which are offered to supplant the "old essential candors" give too much the impression of artificial intellectual constructs rather than interpretations of mental realities. As a physician writing on nervousness has said: "The human being presides over the conflict of his own instincts, felt by him as a conflict of emotions. He presides over this conflict with intelligence and with a consciousness of the power and necessity of choice." [13]

CONTROL OF THE INSTINCTS

Far more significant than control *by* instincts is control *of* instincts; and far more significant

[13] Dr. Austin Fox Riggs, *Mental Hygiene*, April, 1922, p. 269.

than emotional excitability is the direction and cultivation of the emotions—a fact which the instinct psychologist almost wholly ignores. It is this control and cultivation toward which the great moral teachers like Gautama, Confucius, Socrates, Jesus, Paul, set themselves. They have been concerned not with the origin and nature of our instincts and emotions, but with the way we may go about to bring them into order and obedience to the moral will.

This control calls for *conscience* and *volition,* both supposedly outworn fabrications which have no place in the instinct psychology, conscience being pronounced "a false psychological assumption" [14] and volition, "only a more subtle and complex interplay of those impulses which actuate all animal behavior," [15] its "fundamental impulse being self-regard." [16]

The case for conscience cannot here be argued at length. Dean Rashdall has done this with great pertinence and force in his able criticism of McDougall's *Social Psychology* entitled, *Is*

[14] *Social Psychology,* p. 8. In his *Outline of Psychology* McDougall considerably modifies this cavalier attitude toward conscience, defining it as "character developed under moral guidance" (p. 442); yet he still regards it as "always an impulse awakened within the sentiment of self-regard" (p. 440).

[15] *Ibid.,* p. 231.

[16] *Ibid.,* p. 249.

Conscience an Emotion? Suffice it to say that the theory of conscience as an intuitive moral sense, developing as moral selfhood develops, is no more out of keeping with the evolutionary hypothesis than a theory which attempts to reduce the rich and intricate inner life of man to a mere interplay of the animal instincts. *Conscience is the knowledge that there is duty.* It is awareness of the moral imperative. Conscience does not, however, give the knowledge of specific duties or of the course of duty in a concrete situation. That is the province of what has been called the *moral judgment,* the discerning of one's individual duty in each particular situation by means of the exercise of the mind as a whole. Conscience is not an automaton endowed with the special task of saying: this is right and this is wrong. Much less is it an emotion, as Dean Rashdall has ably demonstrated. Conscience is rather, as the term indicates, a knowing of the mind with itself. The problem that confronts one is not so much how to meet a situation advantageously as how to meet it morally, dutifully. What is the *right thing* for me to do in this situation? That is the question a true man asks himself. It may very well be that the right act is one that makes

for one's own well-being, but that does not render it any the less moral.

CONSCIENCE AND MORAL CODES

Moral living builds up moral codes. The code is due, not originally to an external but to an inner compulsion. The code of moral obligation is in a sense given by divine authority, yet drawn out of the moral nature of man in the school of experience. The ten commandments are from Sinai, but they are also from the soil, from above and from within. They are both imparted and evolved. They come out of the sky of the universal and eternal but also out of society itself in its struggle to adjust itself to the whole of life. Life cannot go on at all without the *shalts* and *shalt nots* of group morality.

Yet no moral code can adequately prescribe the details of individual conduct. Within the wide enclosures of the moral law each must find his own way, make his own applications, discover duty for himself—the duty of this particular crisis, this hour, this moment. Conscience lays upon him this inviolable obligation, but to determine the specific duty of the present

concrete issue calls for the coöperative action of his whole selfhood.

To live by the instincts alone means to remain in the animal stage of existence; to live by conscience means to advance into the realm of the moral, the personal, the social.

Chapter XI

BEHAVIORISM

The latest arrival in the psychological household, already a family of considerable size and variety, is that *enfant terrible,* as John Laird calls it, Behaviorism. A psychology which discards consciousness—thus discounting the cardinal purpose of psychology as expressed in George T. Ladd's well-known definition, "the description and explanation of the states of consciousness as such," and Wundt's, "the system of our experiences in consciousness"—would appear to have forfeited the very name of psychology. And yet this is the position of that widely influential exponent of behaviorism, Professor John B. Watson.

THE PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIORISM

"The time seems to have come," writes Professor Watson, "when psychology must discard all reference to consciousness." [1] In place of consciousness he would substitute *conduct,* in

[1] See *The Monist,* April, 1921, p. 185.

the sense of *behavior*. Behavior is defined as "the separate systems of reaction that the individual makes to his environment." [2] These reactions depend upon "the total striped and unstriped muscular and glandular changes which follow upon a given stimulus." [3] All our conduct consists of responses, which are either explicit or implicit, habitual or hereditary reactions, including thinking, which consists of "subvocal talking." There is thus no such thing as thinking in the older sense of the word. Nor is there any use of images. "I should throw out imagery altogether," writes Dr. Watson, "and attempt to show that practically all natural thought goes on in terms of sensory-motor processes in the larynx." [4] How, then, does psychology, thus regarded, differ from physiology? Professor Watson answers, "Physiology teaches us concerning the functions of the special organs." Psychology gives us "the organism, as it were, put together again and tested in relation to its environment as a whole." [5]

We would hardly look for the term *personality* to occur in a psychology of this sort; but

[2] *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, p. 13.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 14.
[4] *Psychological Review*, 1913, p. 174, quoted by A. O. Lovejoy, *The Philosophical Review*, March, 1922, p. 143.
[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

it does. In fact it is made much of. What is the conception of personality held by behaviorism? "Let us mean by the term personality," says Professor Watson, "an individual's total assets (actual and potential) and liabilities (actual and potential) on the reaction side." [6] In line with this view of personality is the title of a recent volume by Dr. Louis Berman, *The Glands Regulating Personality.*[7]

DIFFERING ESTIMATES OF BEHAVIORISM

Unquestionably, psychology—or something that assumes the name—may be handled in this way, all the activities of mental and moral life being reduced to motor reflexes, and personality itself to an organized set of reactions. The system works, just as many another system of superficial ideas has worked, until it works itself out, through exposure to experience and rationality. The question is—is the explanation a true and sufficient account of the phenomena it claims to interpret? Is its account of our mental life adequate? That behaviorism is having a large influence not only upon psychology but upon education and philosophy is undeniable. One

[6] Watson, *Psychology,* p. 397.

[7] A caustic review of this volume may be found in *Mental Hygiene,* April, 1922, p. 410.

may cite so enthusiastic a statement as that of Professor E. B. Holt:

> I believe in the future of psychology, human as well as animal, to be in the hands of the behaviorists and of those who may decide to join them.[8]

Yet the critics of the theory have no difficulty in exposing its weaknesses. Take, for example, such a criticism as the following from Henry Rutgers Marshall:

> It is absurd for a student of biology to tell us that the study of the relation of consciousness to behavior is of no value to him, and especially absurd for him to hold that all study of consciousness in itself is useless. Yet this latter position is taken by not a few able men among the so-called "behaviorists," and this in the face of the fact that we can scarcely hope to state in terms of behavior certain mental states that have much to do with human conduct; for instance, the state we describe as belief.[9]

Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy, at the conclusion of a trenchant article, "The Paradox of the Thinking Behaviorist," hardly exaggerates when he writes:

[8] *The Freudian Wish*, p. 204.
[9] *Mind and Conduct*, p. 11.

Behaviorism, in short, belongs to that class of theories which become absurd as soon as they become articulate.[10]

A BRIEF CRITICISM OF BEHAVIORISM

There are at least three fundamental constituents of psychic life which behaviorism, as advocated by Professor Watson, attempts to dispense with: (1) consciousness, (2) thought, (3) motive.[11] In the article in the *Philosophical Review* referred to, Professor Lovejoy shows how absurd are these denials.

> The behaviorist will certainly not deny that he "observes" and thinks of things not contained within his own skin; he cannot take the first step in the formulation of his own account of the antecedents and determinants of bodily behavior without making this claim. . . . And the awareness of the investigator, even of one investigator only, is sufficient to disprove the contention that no such phenomenon as awareness is to be found.[12]

The attempt to get rid of consciousness is like trying to escape one's shadow. It can be done only by going into the dark.

[10] *The Philosophical Review,* March, 1922.

[11] I do not find these treated as castaways in Professor E. L. Thorndike's *The Original Nature of Man,* which is generally referred to as a behavioristic treatise. Such radicalism as that of Watson is not to be attributed to all forms of behaviorism.

[12] *Op. cit.,* p. 141.

The denial of thought is equally without warrant. It is easy to say that thoughts and motives are simply determined forms of behavior—reactions of an organism that has no alternatives. But that is simply begging the question. If you say, I must think as I do because the reflexes of my muscles determine my thought, it is just as reasonable to hold that the muscles act as they do because one thinks as he does. Either assertion is an inference. All that the psychologist can show is concomitant activity. The behaviorist denies one side of the concomitance—thought. The denial is one which no one, before him, had even *thought* of making—which denial is thus itself a thought.

Because, when one thinks, there is an experimentally determinable process of muscular contractions as well as molecular changes in the brain, does it follow that his thought consists of either the muscular or brain changes, or both? As well say that because when a flower blooms certain chemical processes take place, therefore the flower is nothing more than these processes. It is quite true that without the chemical action there would be no flower, but to say that that, and nothing else, *is* the flower would be to say that there is no flower. So, to say that

behavior constitutes personality is equivalent to saying that there is no such thing as personality.

HAS PSYCHOLOGY GONE DAFT?

A singularly irrational movement has been going on for some time in psychology—at least it seems such to those not on the inside—of which behaviorism is the climax. The James-Lange theory of the emotions seems to have started it, the theory that "we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful." [13] The theory has had enough of exploitation and refutation to make it familiar. Doubtless the truth in it is that the physical side of an emotion is not merely its consequent, but its concomitant. But to make it the cause or antecedent of the emotion is surely to fly in the face of consciousness, as well as of common sense, and to put the cart before the horse. Cart and horse may in this case be undetachable, and the cart as well as the horse may fur-

[13] William James, *Psychology*, p. 376. See the reply of Professor James Ward in his article on "Psychology" in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

nish power, but it certainly does not drag the horse.

Behaviorism decapitates both our emotions and our ideas. It denies the existence not only of a thinker but of an actor. Actions without an actor make as weird a dance as that of the famous bloodless categories. Does not a simple and sufficient refutation of behaviorism as as *ism* lie, in fact, in the existence and power of *motives?* Granted that we behave—well or ill—the question is *why* do we behave as we do? What makes the muscles—striped and unstriped—act diversely in different individuals? Why do men ever respond differently to the same situation? No answer is intelligent that leaves out the presence of motives, and of a self who has them. What is it which acting upon an impulse toward a reaction suddenly arrests it? Why do we ever curb or inhibit our instinctive actions? Why does so great a part of our daily lives consist in doing something other than that which our instincts prompt us to do? The fact can hardly be denied, even by behaviorism. "While instincts and reflexes are dominant in the primary stages of our life history, intelligent control comes in at an early age to modify these inherited forms of behavior," declares a by-no-

means old-fashioned psychologist.[14] Intelligent control and behaviorism are incompatible.

EDUCATION A REFUTATION OF BEHAVIORISM

Is education a form of behavior? Only in a secondary sense. Professor Thorndike, who makes so much of behavior as the response to a situation, and also of the possibilities of education, may say that education itself is a form of *response to a situation.* As a matter of fact, however, you have in the effort to alter and improve the original nature of man by education as much an effort to *change* a situation as to meet one—the situation being exactly that created by instinctive behavior, i.e., the tendency to act automatically rather than intelligently. Education is thus itself a refutation of behaviorism. For, as Professor Thorndike himself says, "The instinctive tendencies of man must often be supplemented, redirected, and even reversed."[15] But what becomes of behaviorism when exposed to such a process?

The fact is that every deterministic and naturalistic psychology and philosophy, including

[14] James R. Angell, *Introduction to Psychology,* p. 224.
[15] *The Original Nature of Man,* p. 310.

behaviorism, is refuted the instant one begins the process of education, that is, *to learn to behave intelligently.*[16]

[16] Since writing the above criticism of behaviorism there has come into my hands Dr. A. A. Roback's competent and trenchant *Behaviorism and Psychology,* in which, after pointing out how unjust it is to the American student of psychology "to be required to wade through the quagmire of leavings from physiology and biology," he proceeds to analyze the various forms which behaviorism has taken at the hands of its recent advocates. He then offers a well-directed criticism of behaviorism from the basic principles of ethics, jurisprudence, medicine, religion and the social field and shows how absurd it is to attempt to detach psychology from introspection and consciousness. Declaring that "a decade of sanguine exposition of the doctrine has failed to yield the promised results," he predicts that "the behavioristic movement has already passed the zenith of its glory" (p. 207). The reader who desires a convincing refutation of behaviorism is directed to this volume.

Chapter XII

PSYCHOANALYSIS

Psychoanalysis has become a word to conjure with and its originator, Sigmund Freud, who has been pronounced "the most original and creative mind in psychology in our generation," [1] is hailed by his followers as a second Darwin. But that does not exempt this new and aggressive science, as it claims to be, from challenge and criticism.

PSYCHOANALYSIS UNBALANCED

At the risk of being regarded as a bigoted defender of old-fashioned ideas, I take my place with those who find in psychoanalysis a hectic and one-sided psychology as well as a reckless and unsound ethics. There is much in the movement to tempt one to characterize it in the caustic sentence with which André Tridon's book, *Psychoanalysis and Love,* was disposed of by a reviewer in *The Nation,* "Claptrap, founded partly in science but clad entirely in

[1] G. Stanley Hall in his Introduction to Freud's *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis.*

jargon."[2] Yet while such a characterization might apply to much that passes under the name of psychoanalysis, it would be unjust to the method itself.

There can be no doubt that there is a principle in psychoanalysis which is of permanent value. It lies, as the term itself indicates, in the analysis of mental states. Psychoanalysis in mental disease corresponds to diagnosis in organic disease and should precede wise treatment in the former as diagnosis does in the latter. The criticism which is here offered is not directed against psychoanalysis itself so much as against the particular presuppositions and methods which govern the Freudian school. This is due to imposing certain subjective presuppositions upon psychoanalysis which color all of its findings and thus vitiate the principle itself[3] and make "popular Freudianism perhaps the most pestilential of all the winds of doctrine."[4]

Perhaps the chief defect of the Freudian psychoanalysis lies in an unscientific exaggeration and lack of balance. This is not peculiar to it by any means. In any specific line of interest

[2] *The Nation*, New York, August 2, 1922.

[3] No estimate is attempted here of the saner psychoanalysis of Jung.

[4] Stuart P. Sherman, *The Genius of America*, p. 224.

or investigation there is a natural—not to say scientific—tendency to exaggerate the importance of the particular set of phenomena upon which attention is engaged and to spread these facts out over a far wider field than they can legitimately cover.

This tendency to make a limited group of facts govern an entire area appears, in the first place, in the Freudian *Psychology of Errors.* Freud finds a subtle and sinister import in our common and hitherto supposedly negligible everyday errors, such as the forgetting of words and names, slips of the tongue, and slips in writing. (Happily he omits spelling.) Failures to recall names, he holds, are enwrapped in somber implications indicating all sorts of suspicions and secret aversions operating under what is called the "unpleasantness principle." If this be true it is appalling to think of what evasions and animosities one has been all unconsciously guilty in forgetting names and words, which the avenging angel of Forgetfulness has recorded in the secret volume of the unconscious.

The clew to mistakes in the use of words and of lapses of memory Freud finds in the *suppression of an intention,* or in the conflict of two intentions. Undoubtedly many of our unfortunate blunders and forgettings are accounted for

in this way, but many more are not. Any one who has observed the working of his own mind knows perfectly well that when he does not say what he wishes, or when he means to say one thing and says another, the cause generally lies either in carelessness or in fatigue. He simply does not attend to what he is doing. To attribute these errors to hidden sinister feelings or motives is as unjust as it is unscientific.

AN UNWARRANTED ESTIMATE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

In the second place, unless psychology as a whole has been misled, psychoanalysis has greatly overestimated the importance of the unconscious. When Freud states that "the psychic processes are in themselves unconscious, and those which are conscious are merely isolated acts and parts of the total psychic life," [5] he is disparaging the importance, if not the actual content, of consciousness. His description of the relation of the unconscious to the conscious is very graphic.

> We will compare the system of the unconscious to a large ante-chamber in which the psychic impulses rub elbows with one another, as separate beings. There

[5] *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, p. 7.

opens out of this ante-chamber another, a smaller room, a sort of parlor which consciousness occupies. But on the threshold between the two rooms there stands a watchman; he passes on the individual psychic impulses, censors them, and will not let them into the parlor if they do not meet his approval.

This is the well-known *censor* of which the psychoanalysts make so much. It bears a very close resemblance to what used to be called conscience, only that it has lost for psychoanalysis the outworn connection with right and wrong. Whatever his nature or his rights, the acts of the *censor* are conscious acts, and this fact at once gives to consciousness a formative part in our inner life which psychoanalysis refuses to recognize. Let it be granted that in the ante-chamber of the unconscious there occur surges of appetite, instinct, and impulse which emanate from our physical life; it is the admission of these into the chamber of consciousness, where they become the instigators of conscious conduct, that matters most. Suppose the *censor* to be drugged and carried off so that the impulses from the unconscious could rush into the parlor and have everything their own way—what would result? A sorry mess, to say the least. Would psychoanalysis reënforce the censor, or retire him?

Freudian psychoanalysis also greatly exaggerates the disturbing effect of subconscious memories. Undoubtedly they exert a baleful effect hitherto overlooked, but it is the memories that thrust themselves persistently into consciousness and refuse to be suppressed or forgotten, that disturb and unman us most.

AN OVEREMPHASIS UPON SEX

Another and most baneful exaggeration on the part of psychoanalysis lies in its unconscionable magnifying of the sex instinct. Almost every thorough psychologist, including G. Stanley Hall, who writes the introduction to Freud's *General Introduction to Psychoanalysis,* recognizes this overemphasis of sex; yet there is little or no attempt to correct it or to show its sinister results. The extent to which Freud carries the dominance of the sex instinct over life approaches abnormality. It amounts almost to an obsession. He finds it everywhere. Childhood, youth, manhood, womanhood, our very laughter and dreams are governed by it. Freud has bought a starling which has been taught to say nothing but—*sex.* Undoubtedly this deep-seated instinct does play a larger part in life than has been accorded to it, either by ethics

or by psychology; but to fill the whole human horizon with it, until one can see nothing else, gives a neurotic hue to life which the normal person knows to be false.

Especially offensive and exaggerated is the sway which Freud extends to the sex impulse over childhood, involving, as Woodworth has said, "a very forced interpretation of child life." [6] One of the chief characteristics of childhood is innocence. No one who knows children but recognizes this and rejoices in it. Of course there is curiosity concerning sex among children and often enough a morbid interest in it, but it is slight compared with other healthier interests in normal child life, and to drag it into a false light and give it a prominence that does not belong to it is most misleading. We are assured that by *sex* Freud means something more than sex, but if so the wider meaning fails to appear.

The dismal thing about Freud's treatment of sex is the absence from it of any sense of sacredness, or even of romance, investing the sex relationship. The full meaning of sex cannot be grasped except in the light of its place in life as a whole, from its beginnings in plant life to its beautiful culmination in human life, where, if it is personalized, it becomes the normal ex-

[6] *Psychology*, p. 567.

pression of devoted and loyal love. To miss all of this is to put oneself outside the ranks of qualified interpreters of the place of sex in human life.[7] Even in primitive religion this inherent sacredness was dimly felt and found expression in symbols and ceremonies which too easily shock our sex sensitiveness. All religions have either degraded or hallowed sex. It has remained for our ultra-scientific age to rob it of its sacredness, as well as its romance, and reduce it to purely physiological and psychical terms. Science is doing an incalculable service in teaching us the facts about the sex life, but it does not hold the final word about the mystery and sacrament of human life and love.

THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

The practice of psychoanalysis as a therapy is subject to serious criticism. It consists, briefly, in the practitioner eliciting from the patient as complete a disclosure as possible of his or her most intimate experience bearing upon the neurosis to be treated, especially as disclosed

[7] One of the best refutations of Freudism is the amusing play, "Suppressed Desires," by G. C. Cook and Susan Glaspell. It will be said that Freud is not presenting a theory of sex but simply exposing facts. But what facts are uncolored by a theory, especially in the field of mental investigation? And what if opposing facts are ignored?

in dreams, in the effort to discern the disturbing factor and thus by "freeing the libido" [8] to remove the disturbance.

It would be shortsighted to deny a certain measure of efficacy to such a method, although it is not in all respects as new as it might appear to be. Confession has always been good for the soul, as Christian mothers and the Roman Catholic Church have understood for a long time—although their use of it has been quite diverse. For the psychoanalyst confession has in it neither contrition, nor absolution, nor reformation. He stops with the discovery of the *neurosis*. This alone is his goal, "to direct the process of self-discovery." [9] When this has been done he has nothing further to offer, no counsel to give, no regimen to propose. He makes no use of suggestion as a means of cure, but leaves the patient to find out his own means of relief. "What he (the analyst) must *not* do is to assume any of the already-mentioned rôles of Teacher, Suggestionist, Ethical Adviser, and so forth." [10] The deficiency of this form of treat-

[8] There is a striking parallel between Paul's conflict of the flesh and the spirit and Freud's conflict of the *libido* and the censor, with the marked contrast that Freud thinks it is the libido that should have the right of way, while Paul thinks it should be the spirit.

[9] Barbara Low: *Psychoanalysis*, p. 157.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 159.

ment must appear. It could hardly be free from ill consequences.

The evils resulting from the practice of psychoanalysis can perhaps best be indicated by quoting from an editorial in the October (1921) number of *Psyche*, an English review of psychology, which is on the whole favorable to psychoanalysis, although not one of its organs.

> A state of affairs has arisen which cannot fail to produce acute apprehension in instructed observers. In accounting for this it seems fair to say that one of the chief factors is to be found in the insistence of psychoanalysts on the paramount importance of the sex-instinct in mental activity in general and the causation of psychical disorders in particular. This has given people a chance to think and talk about sexual matters, on the pretext of scientific interest, in a way which they could not otherwise have done without grossly violating their own sense of propriety and the dictates of social convention. . . . The effect has in many cases been most detrimental both to the cause of scientific progress and to the "patients" themselves.

So frank an acknowledgment should serve as a caution concerning the probable results attending the practice of psychoanalysis.

THE FREUDIAN BAN UPON REPRESSION

Another serious error of psychoanalysis is its failure to understand the necessity and value of repressions, so-called. No doubt there have been—due in large part to our selfish and deformed social system—unhealthy repressions of fundamental instincts which constitute a serious wrong and peril to human nature. Tennyson has justly scathed such social wrong in that blazing line in Locksley Hall:

> "Cursed be the social wants that sin against the strength of youth!"

All artificial social barriers that stand in the way of normal family life are a menace both to the individual and to society. The repressions of normal sex life which have thus been fostered are only less unnatural than the criminal self-indulgences which constitute the opposite evil.

Yet when the last word has been said about the satisfaction of normal human desires the fact remains—wholly unrecognized by psychoanalysis—that the integrity and well-being of society depend upon the rational restraints and self-denials, indiscriminately termed suppres-

sions, by means of which a self-respecting humanity has built up family life at infinite cost and which a loose radicalism would scatter to the winds. The integrity of family life depends upon the control of the sex instinct, in the interest of society as a whole. It follows that before marriage, and in the case of the unmarried, the instinct must be either suppressed or illicitly indulged, or turned into other channels. Suppression, even at the cost of nervous disorder and suffering, is vastly better than either illegitimate or abnormal indulgence.

Far better than suppression, it is true, is what Freud calls *sublimation;* that is, the turning of the sex impulse into another direction, such as that of unselfish devotion to a cause, or the service of others. But the power to thus sublimate the sex urge, according to Freud, is confined to a few. "Most people," he says, "possess the capacity for sublimation only to a very slight degree." It is a fair question, too, whether absorption in a great task or ideal is *sublimation* or *substitution.* Perhaps it is something of both. However that may be, the experience of thousands of healthy men and women, who are living the fullest and richest kind of a life, proves beyond question that it is entirely possible to live such a life without indulging the

sex instinct. They may have hours of struggle, if not of temptation, when they are called upon to repress this deep-seated instinct, but such repression does not result with them in any nervous or physical disorder whatever, but only in increased moral and spiritual strength.

How thoroughly indifferent Freud is to the hard-won stabilities of social purity is indicated in the following paragraph in his *Introduction to Psychoanalysis:*

> We have found it impossible to take the part of conventional morality, or to estimate highly the way in which society has tried to regulate the problems of sexual life in practice. We can prove to society mathematically that its code of ethics has exacted more sacrifices than it is worth, and that its procedure rests neither on veracity nor wisdom.[11]

Such proof may be confidently challenged.

THE DETERMINISM OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

One other serious defect of Freudianism may here be mentioned—its frank and unrelieved determinism. This is so well described by W. R. Bonsfield, F.R.S., and Paul Bonsfield

[11] P. 375.

(the latter a practitioner of psychoanalysis) that I cannot do better than quote their words:

> The strict Freudian school, in the exuberance of their psychology, have disposed of spirit and find mind a mere function of matter. According to this school, not only is a Divine Will non-existent, but the human will is a figment of the imagination. It teaches that when a man with certain moral ideals struggles against opposing natural instincts, and comes out, as may be, either victor or vanquished, the result is a foregone conclusion. It postulates that in this conflict conduct is governed not by the will of the individual but by a rigid determinism. . . . Freud in a discussion of paranoia observes: "We venture to explain in this way the myths of God, of good and evil, of immortality and the like; that is, to transform metaphysics into meta-psychology." [12]

Whether *meta-psychology* will thus easily dispose of some of the deepest and most cherished convictions of humanity as myths remains to be seen.

[12] "Determinism in Relation to Psycho-Analysis," *Psyche,* October, 1921, p. 111.

Chapter XIII

SUGGESTION AND AUTOSUGGESTION[1]

Suggestion as a psychological term is associated with unintelligent susceptibility to influence. It harks back to a long-recognized disposition on the part of certain minds to yield readily to ideas communicated to them by other minds. One finds it used in this sense, for instance, in Shakespeare's "Tempest," when Antonio says of the survivors of the wrecked vessel, "They'll take suggestion as a cat laps milk." Professor William McDougall's definition of suggestion carries the same implication. "Suggestion is a process of communication resulting in the acceptance with conviction of the communicated proposition in the absence of logically adequate grounds for its acceptance."[2]

Boris Sidis defines it similarly. "By suggestion is meant intrusion into the mind of an idea, met with more or less opposition by the person;

[1] In including Suggestion among the forms of selfless psychology there is no intention of implying that it excludes the idea of the self but only that its emphasis lies elsewhere, *i.e.*, upon the subconscious.

[2] *Social Psychology*, p. 97.

accepted uncritically at last; and realized unreflectively, almost automatically."

That there is such a mental disposition on the part of many individuals, indicating a lack of intellectual and moral independence, which renders them peculiarly easily led in one direction or another, is undoubtedly true. But the term suggestion has quite lost that signification in the use of it which has become most common to-day, that of therapeutic psychology.

Since no discussion of the welfare and progress of the self can well overlook the close relation between inner well-being and mental health it is essential that we turn next to this subject, selecting for discussion a form of mental therapeutics which has won wide attention and acceptance, that of the New Nancy School.

SUGGESTION AS A THERAPY

It is now more than fifty years since healing by means of suggestion has been consciously and more or less successfully practiced. As a matter of fact, however, it has been unconsciously practiced in various forms ever since the medicine man by beating his drum and using his divination devices convinced the sick man that the devils of disease had been driven out of him,

or the later man of medicine has made his patient believe that the prescribed drug surely made him well. But the fault both with the medicine man and the man of medicine has been that while they practiced mental healing they neither of them practiced it with sufficient understanding or sufficient skill and perseverance. Christian Science, New Thought, and other forms of psychotherapy have been more consistent, to say the least, but it is in France, at Nancy, that a theory and practice of healing by suggestion which may claim to be both scientific and practical has been put forth. It would hardly be just to the Nancy School to regard M. Emile Coué as its representative. Nevertheless it is he who has done most to give practical application to its methods. Since the year 1885, Coué has been patiently working out a practice of healing by autosuggestion, at first at Troyes, later at Nancy, where he established his now famous clinic in 1910. Since the war his work and influence have grown rapidly. In 1922 he visited England, leaving behind him a reputation and results which have been widely disseminated by his hand-book, *Self-mastery Through Conscious Autosuggestion,* and by the little volume of C. Harry Brooks, *The Practice of Autosuggestion,* and in the winter of 1923

he quite took America—or at least the more susceptible part of it—by storm.

M. Coué is himself a practitioner, rather than a psychologist, but the psychological principles and implications of his practice have been admirably formulated in a volume of great interest and value by Charles Baudouin, entitled *Suggestion and Autosuggestion.*

AUTOSUGGESTION AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

The leading principles and methods of Couéism are as follows:

1. The chief factor in suggestion is an act which one performs upon himself. Suggestion which is initiated by another is in reality one's own act. This is true even of hypnotism, which is really autohypnotism. In other words, each of us has power to greatly modify his own psychical and physical nature and states.

2. The realm in which this power works is the subconscious or unconscious. M. Coué himself uses the term the unconscious, while Baudouin prefers the subconscious. Virtually they mean the same thing, which Baudouin defines as "not an inferior or subordinate consciousness but a hidden consciousness, a consciousness that lies on a lower level than the

familiar consciousness of everyday life."[3] In a state of relaxation, such as attends the oncoming or outgoing of sleep, there is, say these suggestionists, an outcropping of the subconsciousness which may then be taken advantage of and directed to do certain tasks for the mind or the body. These tasks the subconsciousness performs of itself, principally during sleep but also in waking hours. How and why the subconscious mind accomplishes these tasks, such as healing the body at the point where there is disturbance, or correcting bad habits, or solving difficult problems, the suggestionists do not attempt to say. That is a question for philosophy, perhaps for religion.

3. The faculty or agency by which suggestion operates Coué calls the *imagination.* Baudouin is more inclined to regard it as *thought* or the faculty which forms an *idea,* or *schema,* for the subconscious mind to work out. Whatever be the mental agency employed, it is evident that it is the conscious mind which suggests to the unconscious mind an end to be attained. The conscious mind takes the initiative and direction, the subconscious mind does the work.

[3] *Suggestion and Autosuggestion,* p. 152.

IMAGINATION VS. WILL

In autosuggestion—and this is perhaps the most distinctive claim of the New Nancy School—the will is regarded as an interloper, a hindrance rather than a help. Baudouin offers the interesting theory that the office of the will is to enable us to gain the mastery of the outer world, while suggestion enables us to master ourselves. "The will is the normal way of acting on matter, or the external world, whereas suggestion is the normal way of acting on ourselves as living beings." [4] The failure of the will to counteract a suggestion gives rise to what is termed the law of reversed effort, i.e., "the harder one tries the less he is able." [5] Common experience confirms this assertion. We are all aware of how futile it is to attempt to overcome a fear or a fault by sheer willing. The more we will improvement the worse we get.

If we stop willing and use imagination, says Coué, the desired end will be secured. That is doubtless true in the sense in which he means it. And yet one cannot but ask whether Coué, in the pardonable warmth of his confidence in imagination as over against the will, has not

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 331.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 137.

both underestimated the will and aggravated a conflict which is due rather to an inhibition of the will than to the will itself. What he desires to secure, and evidently succeeds in securing, is that coöperation of imagination and will which Jesus called *faith,* which can indeed remove mountains.[6] To assert that one can imagine a state of health for himself without in some sense willing it, surely is poor psychology. It would presuppose an indifference which would render the suggestion null and void. What Coué really warns against is the powerlessness of an inhibited will. Such a will needs an imaginatively realized idea to empower it.

THE COUÉ FORMULA AND ITS MEANING

The formula which M. Coué, after long study and experience, has framed and freely offers to every one as a simple and sufficient curative, has become so familiar as hardly to need repetition. It is as follows: "Day by day, in every way, I am getting better and better." This is to be repeated twenty times in succession, every morning before getting up and every evening

[6] "All non-medical suggestion cures rely mainly on the emotional power of the act of believing. They are pure faith-cures." Bernard Hollander, M.D., *In Search of the Soul,* p. 279.

on going to bed, "moving the lips and counting mechanically on a long string with twenty knots." "Do not think of anything in particular," adds Coué, "as the words 'in every way' apply to everything." [7] By everything, doubtless he means *relatively* everything. For some persons it will be necessary during such a performance to suppress the sense of humor. But that can be done if necessary; for when one is ill he is sufficiently in earnest to be ready to do anything that promises a cure.

Autosuggestion, according to the Coué method, as a rule works gradually and does not secure an immediate cure, although in some cases great relief and even entire recovery follow at once. Ordinarily, however, continued and patient direction of the mind toward the desired end is required. In this regard, also, the system commends itself as in keeping with physical and psychical process, giving time for the cellular life to conform to the working of the purposeful suggestion transmitted through the unconscious.

M. Coué has also devised a method of relieving pain. This consists of the following treatment, as prescribed in his own words:

[7] *Self-Mastery,* cover page.

Every time in the course of the day or night that you feel any distress, physical or mental, immediately affirm to yourself that you will not consciously contribute to it, but that you are going to make it disappear; then isolate yourself as much as possible, shut your eyes, and passing your hand over your forehead, if it is something mental, or over the part which is painful, if it is something physical, repeat extremely quickly, moving your lips, the words, "It is going, it is going," etc., etc., as long as it may be necessary. With a little practice the physical or mental distress will have vanished in twenty to twenty-five seconds. Begin again whenever it is necessary. Avoid carefully any effort in autosuggestion.[8]

AUTOSUGGESTION NOT CONFINED TO PHYSICAL EFFECTS

It should be added that the Coué school does not confine the effects of autosuggestion to physical healing. It is claimed to be preventive as well as curative in its effects. Moreover it applies to any bad habit that one may desire to overcome, every fear that troubles him, every hindrance that stands in the way of the full

[8] It is frequently said that to assert that one is getting better when he knows that he is not, is to deliberately falsify, in plain words "to lie." I cannot think that this is a just charge. The formula is a declaration of purpose, or desire, put in the form of an affirmation for the reason that this gives to it a strength and positiveness which it would not otherwise have. It is an affirmation in the realm, not of the past, nor the present, but the *future*, an affirmation which is intended *to help fashion what is to be.* It is, therefore, not a lie, however strong the odds against it.

expression of himself. All this, and more, is contained in the very title of Coué's little manual, *Self-mastery through Autosuggestion.* Manifestly here is an instrumentality which, if it is as potent as is claimed, promises remarkable results not only in healing but in education, in the treatment of criminals and defectives and in other directions. It is, however, by no means original with M. Coué. All that he has done is to give to autosuggestion a new interpretation, a new method and a new vogue.

Chapter XIV

SUGGESTION AND AUTOSUGGESTION
(Continued)

One completes a non-professional study of the New Nancy theory and practice of suggestion with a sense of having found more of sanity than usual in a field in which there has been so much of extravagance and incoherence. The evidence of alleviation and cure of nervous disturbances and functional diseases is apparently well attested.

An atmosphere of genuineness, sincerity and altruism pervades the whole movement as well as the personality of M. Coué himself. His constant assertion is that he has never cured any one, but that he only helps one to cure himself. Indeed while to the facetiously healthy he offers a shining butt, to others he seems almost an apostle to a nervously exhausted and war-wearied generation. The marks of prejudice toward established forms of healing are notably absent from Couéism. There is no attempt to discredit the science of medicine or surgery. "Induced autosuggestion is not a sub-

stitute for medical practice," writes Mr. Brooks; "autosuggestion and the usual medical practice should go hand in hand, each supplementing the other."[1] This is in refreshing contrast to the attitude of Christian Science and many schools of faith healing.

It is difficult, it is true, to see how this mental therapeutic and the germ theory of disease with its method of cure can be harmonized. Disease germs certainly operate powerfully, and apparently with a large measure of independence. But on the other hand their activity seems to be greatly affected by mental conditions, being either fostered or inhibited thereby. Evidently we must learn to give due heed both to germs and to germinal ideas, both to the discoveries of the microscope and to those of the psychological clinic.

THE MORAL BEARING OF AUTOSUGGESTION

From the point of view of the personalist, certain questions arise with reference to the theory and application of autosuggestion which call for consideration. One of these is a moral question: Does not the practice of autosuggestion throw too much emphasis upon oneself, as con-

[1] *The Practice of Autosuggestion*, p. 111.

trasted with others, and upon physical as over against moral well-being? The answer to this question is, that unless supplemented and balanced it will have this effect. Unselfish living requires a paradox, that one think of himself and yet forget himself, that he give due care to his own good, but that he also lose his own well-being in concern for others. "He that saveth his life shall lose it and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it." Many a person has found not only inner happiness and peace, but also physical well-being by forgetting himself in the service of others. Yet to adopt this principle to the exclusion of self-improvement would be as one-sided as to think only of making oneself strong and fit for service and to fail to think of those whom he is to serve. The two objectives are not hostile, and in some way, and by each of us for himself, they should be adjusted, so that there may be love both for oneself and his neighbor, self-culture and service.

Much the same is to be said regarding the relation of the physical to the moral in one's own cultivation. The two are so closely united that it is hardly possible to make moral gain without making physical gain, and *vice versa*. And yet they are not the same, and there are times when one must choose between them.

Shall it be physical or spiritual good? Shall it be physical health or moral integrity? One of the two must be primary and the other secondary. Which? The experience of the race, the impulse toward self-improvement, the best principles of ethics, all point to the conclusion that bodily and mental soundness is a great and priceless good—and yet that *there is a greater.* Health—blessed, beneficent, all but indispensable health—whenever it can be had, but duty and devotion above health!

IS AUTOSUGGESTION RELIGIOUS OR NON-RELIGIOUS?

The religious implications of autosuggestion are not immediately apparent. On the surface it might appear as if Couéism were purely naturalistic. The individual suggests to himself, or rather to his unconscious or subconscious mind, certain ends to be secured, and the unconscious mind is supposed to respond and obtain the desired result. It looks as if that might be all there is to it. The Coué formula makes no reference whatever to divine instrumentality or assistance, although Coué advises that the formula be repeated "piously." Mr. Brooks suggests that those who desire might well add to the

formula the words, "By the help of God." The phrase seems not out of keeping, although it carries something of the air of being tacked on. Yet it is impossible to ignore the religious implications of such a theory.

The question inevitably arises: What is the Unconscious and how does it act with reference to religious experience? It can hardly be a purely individual agency, for it is the same in each of us. Our lives cannot be absolutely isolated from each other and from the Common Substratum, whatever it may be, which we all share. Is the Unconscious in each of us itself God? Or do we rather, as William James suggested, come in touch with God *through* the subconsciousness? Why not? with God at least in one of the forms of His immanence? Not that this is the only or the chief part of our being in which we come in touch with God. We may come in touch with Him far more distinctly through our consciousness and that rational nature by means of which we understand something of Him, perhaps still more intimately in that intuitive and spiritual realm of our experience termed the superconsciousness. Yet these higher ways need not prevent our coming in touch with Him in the subconscious also.

But, some one will say, that makes God not

a Person but a Vital Energy, a Life Force. Not necessarily. He may be both Person and Power, Universal Person who is also Universal Creative Energy. Personality may be the very center and essence of His being, but energy or power may be what Job called the outskirts of His ways. Perhaps it is truer than we yet realize that "in him we live and move and have our being." Such a conception raises questions too difficult to deal with here. Suffice it to say that it is not out of keeping with Christianity, which has always persistently held to the creatorship as well as the perfection of God, His immanence as well as His transcendence. It would also make God's nature more nearly correspondent with our own dual natures, though infinitely richer. God is a Spirit, but Spirit may create and express itself through something we call Vital Force which is not itself Spirit, yet serves as its instrument.

CHRISTIANITY AND AUTOSUGGESTION

In the actual practice of autosuggestion it is difficult for a reverent mind to be content with the Coué formula without including some definitely religious consociation. Taken as it is, it is quite too barren and mechanical and self-

operative. One finds himself oppressed by its incompleteness. The religious element may be supplied, either implicitly or verbally, but the desire for it will be experienced by all who feel the need of getting beyond themselves to a Larger Power. That energizing word of the self-suggestive Paul furnishes a good formula with which to alternate the Coué formula: "I can do all things in him which strengtheneth me." The well person needs an autosuggestive formula, as well as the one who is ill. Here is one for him. Suppose the healthy person should begin each day with a twenty-fold charge of this great spiritual dynamic—what would be the result?

AUTOSUGGESTION IN CHRISTIAN HEALING

It is clear that Christianity, beginning with Jesus' own ministry of healing, made large use of something akin to autosuggestion in order to heal both body and mind. When Jesus called for faith on the part of those who would be healed, was it will-power, or what Coué calls imagination? "Wouldest thou be made whole?" Is not this a directing of the mind, or imagination if you like, to the state of wholeness, of well-being? When Peter summoned the lame

man at the beautiful gate of the temple, "In the name of Jesus rise up and walk," did he not present to the man a sudden and potent suggestion of a state to be desired, or imagined, coupled with the suggestion of a power equal to its accomplishment?

It is no detriment to Christian healing that something of the laws and processes by which it operates is now coming to be understood. Nor does the fact that similar results can be accomplished otherwise lessen the incomparable motivation with which Christian psychotherapy works.

CONCLUSION

Dean Inge, that intrepid watch-dog of sanity and rationality, calls Couéism bluff, and satirizes it as an offense both to reason and religion, and as issuing, along with Pragmatism, Christian Science, Bolshevism, and other falsities, from the Father of Lies.[2] But Dean Inge never had shell shock or any acute form of nervous break-down, so far as we know, and his condemnation of autosuggestion is quite too wholesale and academic. It is true that the ideas and phrases of the psychological cults are many of

[2] See *Current Opinion*, June, 1922.

them crude and extravagant—but the principle of autosuggestion itself and the reliance upon a power not ourselves, and yet within ourselves, are as old as the human mind.

Religion, including Christianity, has long made use of this power of renewal and recovery. Not so very different in principle and effect was the habit of our fathers and mothers of committing to memory verses of Scripture and repeating them over and over at times of trouble and weakness. Dean Inge is quite right in contrasting such a prayer as, "God be merciful to me a sinner" with such an ejaculation as, "I am growing better and better"; but there are times when the overborne soul needs not so much to cry for forgiveness, or even for help, as to affirm its own selfhood and reassure itself that it has within, although coming from a higher source, the power of recuperation and victory.

The Bible is a perfect storehouse of suggestion and autosuggestion. By this means it has enabled generations of brave and believing souls to meet life trustfully and victoriously. The Psalm Book is replete with suggestion: "God is our refuge and strength, a very present help in trouble". "The Lord is my shepherd, I shall

not want"; "He that dwelleth in the secret place of the Most High shall abide under the shadow of the Almighty." These and hundreds more of well-loved verses are the very essence of pure and reassuring suggestion, based on rational, normal experience and conviction. The Lord's Prayer is full of the sanest reënforcements of autosuggestion linked with the profoundest religious trust. Paul's ejaculations, "I can do all things through Christ which strengtheneth me," puts the Coué formula well in the shade, making it look puny and childish; but it does not falsify it.

The fact is that a generation of newspaper and magazine readers, devourers of best sellers and devotees of the movies, has lost touch with the Bible and Christian hymns and the great spiritual literature of the ages and is trying to find its way to strength and support through psychological ideas and practices which are new only in more or less scientific and self-conscious externals and technique. This popular propaganda is infinitely inferior to what the church has possessed for nearly twenty centuries, but has too far failed to impart to the people. If through these widespread cults of suggestion and autosuggestion some measure of normality

can be restored to mind and body, they are not to be condemned, however defective their form and content.

Yet the main outcome of this entire chapter of human experience through which we are passing, and the effort to meet the needs of the hour, is to reveal more clearly than ever the essential practicality and resourcefulness of Christian faith.

Chapter XV

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MAN

Without seeking to disparage the real contribution which the new psychology is making to the understanding and control of human conduct, it behooves us to ask in conclusion what interpretation it has thus far given of man, his character and his capacities. What is the *psychological man,* as his outlines begin to emerge from the findings of the psychological laboratory and the texts of the new psychology?

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MAN A NEAR-ANIMAL

In the first place the psychological man is much nearer the animal than for the last twenty-five centuries or more men have conceived themselves to be. In fact, as many recent psychologists have depicted him, he *is* an animal and little more. It would be unjust to say that the cry of the psychologists is: Back to the animal, for they are telling us that we never got away from the animal.[1] And that is dismal news in-

1 E.g., "We are descended from the lower animals. We are furthermore still animals not only with an animal body, but with an animal mind." Robinson, *Mind in the Making,* p. 68.

deed—if true. That we have an animal mechanism whose reactions and behavior are, in many respects, to be understood and treated as such, is quite beyond dispute; and it is unquestionably advantageous to have had recent psychology bring out this fact so clearly. But that these animal traits are the key of our nature is a claim that is far enough as yet from being demonstrated.

The acceptance of the evolutionary hypothesis by no means fills in the gulf between man and the animal, for the reason that no sooner was the transition from animal to man made than the gulf between them began widening and has continued to widen ever since. The more man becomes man the farther he grows away from the animal.[2] It is true that his physical and psychical structure remains unalterably akin to the animal, but he is constantly adapting it to higher ends as he himself moves away from the jungle. It is true also that he is often pulled back by his animal nature, and that of his own accord he sometimes slinks back. Nevertheless although "man is not man as yet" in the full sense of the word, he is climbing *per*

[2] The dog is often instanced as showing how near the higher animals are to man. But the fact is that the dog is more than half a *creation* of man—the great example of how far man can impress his own nature upon a lower nature.

aspera ad astra, to use a high-school motto which is not all sentiment. The fact is, that when once man had emerged from the animal he could not go back. *He must either become better or worse than the animal;* and individual men and groups of men have been doing one or the other ever since.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MAN AN ABSTRACT ANIMAL

The psychological man is not only an animal, or near-animal, but such an animal as never was on land or sea. That is, he is an *abstract animal.* It seems incongruous, at first thought, to accuse science, in the form of psychology, of abstraction. But such is the charge to which psychology has exposed itself. Indeed one of the leading exponents of the new psychology, Professor E. L. Thorndike, has not only admitted the indictment but has himself drawn it. In the second chapter of his volume, *The Original Nature of Man,* in treating of the relation of a *situation* to a *response* he writes thus:

> In taking anything short of the rich entirety of the man at that instant as the organism, we are abstracting —are replacing the total effective conditions of the response by some of the main features. Such abstraction

is, of course, the procedure of common sense and of science.[3]

Abstraction is indeed the procedure of science, if not of common sense, and there is no objection whatever to the use of it on the part of psychology, provided it is acknowledged to be abstraction. But a large number of scientists, including many psychologists, practice abstraction either without knowing, or without acknowledging, that it is abstraction. And a still greater number of the devotees of science accept these abstractions as if they were most concrete and exact realities.

The apparent justification and confirmation of this abstraction of certain characteristics of man, and the consequent setting up of the result as man himself, is the pragmatic argument that it works. No doubt it does. But so do many things that "aren't so." Superstition worked for millenniums as successfully if not as satisfactorily as science. Many pseudo-scientific theories have worked. The Ptolemaic system worked, until Galileo and Copernicus arose. Unmodified gravitation worked, until Einstein appeared. The faculty psychology worked, until William James thrust his inquisitive mind into it and dis-

[3] P. 11.

turbed its complacency. Workability is a fair and true test, but it is not the final test. No test is final which ignores part of the facts; and when the facts ignored are leading facts the theory requires revision. *The trouble with the psychological man is that as man he is not all there.* Certain very important human factors are left out.

THE ETHICAL MAN

Contrasted with the *psychological man* is the self, the person. Instead of being an animal, consisting of reflexes, reactions, instincts, he is a free intelligence, "with power on his own self and on his deed." Instead of being a natural automaton, he is a spiritual self.

It is easy to say, of course, that there is no ethical man, that what is called duty is simply a sense of strain arising out of the conflict of emotions, that will is "almost the same thing as the instinct of self-assertion" [4] and that conscience is only an emotion.

This *psychologizing* away of the ethical man is going on at a rapid pace, and as a consequence this once dominant and revered factor in education and religion, the moral person, is, for many

[4] R. S. Woodworth, *Psychology*, p. 536.

minds, fading into the thin air of an obsolescent fiction. Yet, not so fast! In the conflict of emotions what determines the choice of one line of action above another as representing "higher" individual and social values? What does value mean as a motive? Why put the good of the whole above one's own? Naturalistic ethical theories long ago attempted in vain to dispose of the sense of moral obligation. It has not yielded to them, nor will it yield to a mechanistic psychology.

The attempt to fuse the ethical man in the psychological man, conceived as a mechanism, meets with no sharper criticism than that of some of the broader psychologists themselves. In an article in the *Journal of Religion* (January, 1923), Professor George M. Stratton of the University of California writes:

> In a letter published not long ago, it was said that the teaching of psychology in the universities should be prohibited. This is perhaps an extreme position, at least to the eye of a psychologist. And yet there is a trend within the study which is a menace to the common good, a rebuke to the usual forms of aspiration. For in more than one instance its specialists have favored a description and estimate of the mind, the very opposite of what is required, not merely by religion, but by plain morals. The freedom of the person, the superior-

ity of his mind to his body, the very existence of mind, not to use such unfavored terms as soul or spirit—these, from the utterance of many in the profession, are doubtful or untrue. The gross effect for many students is to diminish, if not remove, the ground for belief in moral responsibility and immortality, to erase the distinction of mind and body, to accentuate instinctive action and to elevate into dominance the sexual appetite. . . .

. . . But does not psychology prove that the mind, whatever be its ruling passion, is a machine?

No; it assumes and partly proves the mind's orderliness, the subjection of its events to causal explanation. Still, how far this leaves the mind from a mere mechanism! . . . The mind is partly a machine and partly a master mechanic, its mastery all the while growing. If one, in spite of this, dwells only on the mind's insignificance, its blindness, its powerlessness, its want of self-direction, these are but partial and, if offered as the whole, are to be received as signs of bias in the psychologist rather than as pronouncements of psychology.

But is not the ethical man an abstraction, too? No sooner is the question asked than it becomes evident that he, too, in his own way and manner is an abstraction. He is set forth to the mind's eye and made real and puissant by abstracting the noblest qualities and capacities in human nature and overlooking those animal traits which experimental psychology has probed and published to a gaping public.

Is the ethical man any truer to reality, then,

than the psychical man? Yes; for this reason. In the process of abstraction, which is as essential for philosophy as for science, it makes the greatest possible difference *whether the abstraction is of those qualities which are central and characteristic or of those which are secondary.* Ethics has abstracted the more distinctive human qualities and psychology the less distinctive. Ethics has selected the loftier and more unique traits and psychology the lower and more general. As between the two, the ethical man is truer to the best that is in humanity and is therefore the sounder abstraction. It is upon him that the hope of the future rests. It is surely not without significance that the American pioneer in the field of physiological psychology, George T. Ladd, reached so positive a conclusion as the following: "The development of mind can only be regarded as the progressive manifestation in consciousness of the life of a real being which, although taking its start and direction from the action of the physical elements of the body, proceeds to unfold powers that are *sui generis* according to laws of its own." (*Elements of Physiological Psychology,* p. 632.)

THE HARMONIZING OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MAN AND THE ETHICAL MAN

Yet the abstract man is not the whole man, not the everyday man with whom we have to deal in ourselves and others. Analysis, essential as it is to knowledge, is not sufficient. The ethical man and the psychological man need to be synthesized. This can never be done so long as psychology ignores ethics, or ethics psychology. Nor can it be done unless the ethical man is given the priority over the psychological man, until, in other words, the inherent distinction between higher and lower, between the spiritual and the physical within us is recognized. For, as Sir Thomas Browne wrote, "there is surely a piece of divinity in us, something that was before the elements, and owes no homage unto the sun." [5] And unless this divinity in us is given its due place we are less than human.

The psychological man and the ethical man are in union, yet they are not one. They cannot be separated, for they are bound up together in the same individual, yet they are not completely harmonious and cannot become so until each individual self harmonizes them in himself. That, indeed, is the moral task of each of us.

[5] *Religio Medici,* XI.

For unless these two are rightly related there develops an internecine conflict out of which one cries with St. Paul, "Wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" To train our instincts and sentiments to act in consonance with our moral principles, and thus to harmonize the psychological man and the ethical man—this is not only our individual task but our common human enterprise.

Chapter XVI

CONCLUSION: THE SHAPING OF SELVES

How may one harmonize his instincts and his principles and reach the highest personal worth and power of creative service possible to him? In other words, how may he become a true *person?* This is the practical issue growing out of our discussion.

SUPERFICIAL NOTIONS OF PERSONALITY

The bookstores and libraries and magazine columns of to-day are flooded with instructions as to How to Achieve a Magnetic Personality and similar titles, containing much alluring advice concerning how to conduct oneself ingratiatingly, how to win attention and advancement, how to decipher the "personalities" of others, etc., etc.—all well enough in its way, perhaps, but the way is second rate.[1] One of these books

1 This usage of the term personality seems to gain some warrant from a non-ethical use of it made by leading psychologists. One may instance Professor R. S. Woodworth, who names as factors of personality: physique, *chemique,* instincts and intelligence. *Psychology,* pp. 553 ff.

pays Shakespeare the high tribute of stating that he would have made a capital salesman. What a loss to business when he chose to be a poet! All this sort of thing is on the surface and conceals the real issue. Instruction in commercialized personality—how to "make good" rather than "be good," how to become efficient rather than sufficient—is froth on the surface of a great deep. The "limit" of this obsession is reached in the psychology of salesmanship—with its slogan, "Learn to sell yourself"—so searchingly ridiculed by Stuart P. Sherman in his chapter on "The Shifting Center of Morality" in his *The Genius of America.*

What really matters is not this, but *how to develop the latent personal manhood or womanhood that makes one of worth in himself and an asset to society,* incidentally no doubt increasing his efficiency, but that is secondary.

THE MATERIALS FOR CONSTRUCTING A PERSONALITY

A bundle of instincts, a gleam of self-consciousness, a modicum of intelligence, a potential touch of creativeness, a glimmer of con-

science—a body, a "soul"—what can be made out of these? They are vital potencies, but set in the midst of heavy hindrances; for we are begirt on every side by mountain walls of environment, hemmed in by jungles of heredity, conditioned not only by inner limitations but by possibilities of ill-adjustment and conflict among the very powers we possess. What then can be achieved of real and lasting worth? What can be done to shape real personalities out of this raw material?

The first thing to notice is that *something has to be done.* Life is urgent and imperative and compels some sort of response and activity, out of which a selfhood emerges, often with little of shapeliness or consistency, yet always interesting, sometimes admirable. When one looks out sympathetically over the world of his fellow beings he cannot but take heart at the number of true and worthy persons he discovers. With all the failures, conscious and unconscious, the twisted, deformed lives, some obstinately willful and others pitifully weak, the many who are themselves miserable and making others miserable—taking all these into account—the notable fact is the number of strong and beautiful personalities that emerge. One may well exclaim

with Miranda, as he observes these many fine humans:

> O wonder!
> How many goodly creatures are there here!
> How beauteous mankind is! O brave new world
> That has such people in't!

This is doubtless an exceptional, not to say roseate, view to take of humanity. But it is not a false view. It is not necessary to deny the terrible tragedy of a world that has in it so many wretched, worthless, and vicious men and women. The knowledge of the hosts of morons among us has come home to our open-eyed generation with terrible realism. Yet, when all has been said, there remains the significant fact that out of all the wreckage, out of the cosmic and human evolutionary process have come, as gold from the fire, so many worthful persons, priceless in purity and beauty and strength. And the failures—are they complete, absolute, hopeless? Is it certain that they will never, in this life or another, win through at last? Above all, there is the future, the yet unstained, unwasted, ever-beckoning future, the fresh opportunity. What can be made of *that* by each of us individually, and all of us together? The possibilities of per-

sonality, whatever its actualities, are undeniably immeasurable.

HUMAN NATURE AS IT IS

There is a vast and depressing and unreasonable cynicism abroad to-day concerning human nature.[2] One who cannot take genuine interest and pleasure in his fellow men needs to have his eyes anointed with the common clay of our human nature. It is true that as he grows older and wiser one sees flaws and failings, and worse, in those whom he had worshiped as gods and goddesses, but he also sees virtues and attractions, or at least reasons for charitable judgment, in those in whom before he had seen only deformities and faults.

In one of our moods—one of our best and truest—we do not wish to see our comrades made over or changed in any way, so interesting and lovable are they. However soiled, they seem all to be archangels. This may be called the *Whitmanesque mood.* He is to be pitied who never has it, who never looks round him with the eyes of Addison's Sir Roger de Coverley

[2] Let me instance Ludwig Lewisohn's brilliant, but pessimistic, *Upstream*—which should be entitled *Downstream*—with its unstinted criticism of every one who hasn't helped him and every one who has.

or foots the "Open Road" with Walt Whitman or David Grayson, taking immeasurable joy in those whom he passes and those with whom he travels.

THE DARKER SIDE

But are we not deceiving ourselves thus with a one-sided and untrue portrait of humanity? Have we not been idealizing it and thus misrepresenting it? When we look more closely at men and women as they are, may it not be rightly charged:

> "Devil and brute, Thou dost transmute
> To higher, lordlier show."

That which we so proudly hold up as the highest achievement of humanity—a self-won personality—what is it but a painted sham, or at best a frail and perishable thing, too weak to bear the weight of honor thrust upon it? Scratch personality and what do you find but animality?

It must be conceded that there is ground for this pessimism. A host of parasitic growths attach themselves to personality. Turn far back of present-day psychology, for instance, to such a picturesque account of human defects as one finds in that old and interesting book "once the

favorite of the learned and the witty," Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy,* with its formidable array of evils and ills, "dotage, frenzy, madness, ecstasy, lycanthropia, *chorus sancti viti,* hydrophobia, possession or obsession of devils, melancholy."

> For a pint of honey thou shalt here likely find a gallon of gall, for a dram of pleasure a pound of pain, for an inch of mirth an ell of moan; as ivy doth an oak, these miseries encompass our life. . . . We are not here, as those angels, celestial powers and bodies, sun and moon, to finish our course without all offense, with such constancy, to continue for so many ages; but subject to infirmities, miseries, interrupted, tossed, and tumbled up and down, carried about with every small blast, often molested and disquieted upon each slender occasion, uncertain, brittle, and so is all that we trust unto.[3]

With all its garrulous exaggerations this old book presents a side of our nature that cannot be overlooked. The cause of this confusion and corruption, however, can be no longer found where Burton and those of his age and of others found it, in the *Fall of Man:*

> Man, once the abridgment and epitome of the world, as Pliny, sovereign of the earth, viceroy of the world . . . But this most noble creature, *Heu tristis et lachrymosa*

[3] Robert Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy.*

commutatio (one exclaims), O pitiful change! is fallen from what he was and forfeited his estate, become *miserabilis homuncio,* a castaway, a caitiff, one of the most miserable creatures of the world . . . and so much obscured by his fall that he (some few reliques excepted) is inferior to a beast.

This easy, wholesale assignment of all our sins and ills to the fall of Adam survives only in obsolete theological treatises. We have come, largely through the study of animal psychology, to recognize our close kinship with our brothers of earth and water and air, to see ourselves partakers with them of a common heritage. Oneself and one's fellows remind him of the gulls that follow the ferry-boats crossing San Francisco Bay. With stately poise and sweep of wing they cleave the air, like spotless spirits from a celestial world, until something from the kitchen is thrown overboard, when, presto! they are in the water, no longer serene victors of the ether, but a screaming, strident, struggling set of scavengers. How are we mirrored everywhere!

Each of us is a singular combination of contrasts. Who can understand his errors, or his virtues either? That strong, serene example of normal and beneficent goodness, Pastor Oberlin,

gives us this surprising piece of self-description which he wrote to accompany his profile:

> A strange compound of contradictory qualities. I do not yet exactly know what I am to make of myself. I am intelligent; and yet possessed of very limited powers: —prudent and more politic than my fellow-clergymen, but also very apt to blunder, especially when in the least excited. I am firm, yet of a yielding disposition; and both of these, in certain cases, to a great degree. I am not only daring but actually courageous; whilst, at the same time, I am often in secret very cowardly. I am very upright and sincere, yet also very complaisant to men, and in a degree, therefore, insincere.[4]

If this lovable and worthy pastoral soul (efficient, too, O worshiper of efficiency!) found in himself such a world of inconsistencies and contradictions, what must be the case with the rest of us?

THE POWER OF THE IDEAL

Turn again, however, to the obverse and more hopeful side of the picture. If we are smitten with dismay in contemplating our own personal deficiencies and with disappointment in others, still there is the immensely significant fact,

[4] *Memoirs of Oberlin,* Cambridge, 1832, p. 190.

which modern psychology is so inclined to overlook, of *the presence of the ideal,* a power that will not let us go. When one of our lower moods, or selves, is upon us we know that we are not *ourselves,* and the consciousness is painful and humiliating. But how does one know that he is not himself? As Emerson said: "We know that humanity is mean, but how do we know that it is mean?" The very strength of our self-condemnation is the witness and promise of our possibility.

Fail as we may of becoming complete, victorious personalities, the inherent, unfading splendor of the ideal—our own, yet not ours, ours yet not our own—compelling, rebuking, remains imperishable and alluring. The more we fail of reaching the ideal, the more real and regnant it seems to become. "Ever not quite"—William James' words concerning the attempt to explain the universe—is the epitome of our attempt to realize the ideal. Approximations to wholeness and perfection and then a blur, a false stitch, a defective line. In our search for the perfect man or woman we find one almost free and whole—and then "a strain o' the stuff," a "warping past the aim." But the ideal persists. The greatest and most significant fact about persons is not their present worth but their possi-

bilities. If the search for origins and processes, into which psychology has drawn us, leads us to overlook this we will be selling our birthright for a mess of pottage, and that no very savory one either.

THE DIGNITY OF A MORAL BEING

The major concern is not what lies behind but what lies before. The greatest potentiality in life—the only one that "can hold against hell"—is "the winged ideal." It is short-sighted to count this out in our estimates of human nature and its possibilities. In one of those supposedly arid wastes, the lectures of a theologian, may be found the following description of the moral ideal of benevolence by the once famous Nathaniel W. Taylor of New Haven:

> Contemplate, then, a moral being placing benevolence on the throne, and giving it perfect dominion over himself. In such a being you see benevolence the reigning principle—governing, guiding, employing these high powers for these high ends—directing and consecrating all with delightful activity to the accomplishment of these results, and with the joyous anticipation of accomplishing them forever. And now to sway such a scepter—to reign over and employ such powers for such ends—thus to govern and employ intelligence and feel-

ing, and emotion, and will and heart—the entire productive energy of an immortal spirit, and that spirit one's self—what other dominion, what other condition of being, is worthy of a desire or a thought? What sublime dignity, what moral excellence, beauty and glory, in the reigning principle itself! What absolute perfection it imparts to the whole nature of a being the greatest of all, save Him who made him.[5]

One need not quote the entire passage. In spite of its grandiose style and sweeping periods, so different from our present-day mediocrity of expression, the vitality and inspiration have not passed out of it. One can imagine the theological student of that time raising his eyes from his note-book and with idle pen listening to these glowing periods with a sense of something essentially warm and noble enkindling the too often frigid classroom atmosphere.

Under the prosaic sway of the realism of today, afraid to let our idealizing faculty have full play, lest it transform us into its own image and in so doing rob us of our smug self-content, we overlook the immeasurably significant fact of the place and power of the moral ideal in human life.

[5] *Works*, Vol. V, p. 42.

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HELPING OTHERS TO SHAPE THEMSELVES

Yet, with all one's comfort in his fellows as they are, he is no true lover of his kind who does not desire with all his heart to see many of them wholly refashioned and others become completely that which they now are only in part. Can any one go among his fellows and not say in his heart to many a one, as Whitman himself, in quite another mood, cried:

> "Accouche! Accouchez!
> Will you rot your own fruit in yourself there?
> Will you squat and stifle there?" [6]

If there is any business in life bigger than all others, and harder, it is to help one's fellows to re-recover their selfhood and to shape or reshape themselves toward a nobler ideal. It is not enough to love them just as they are, or even to comfort and cheer those who have fallen, overborne in a battle in which they have been too heavily handicapped. We are bound to try to help them to their feet, to aid them to become their better selves. It cannot be done by pious platitudes or good advice, but only by personally imparting to them high ideals, pure motives, and

[6] *Carol of Words*, p. 221.

redemptive forces which have become part of oneself. This is the supreme enterprise of the Christian faith. Christianity takes upon itself also the easier and gentler task of charity and comfort, sympathy and support. It is the good Samaritan among the religions. But its consuming passion is to lead men into a freer, nobler, diviner selfhood, to remake human nature, *to shape and reshape personality,* individual and social, until a Kingdom of God is established.

If psychology, by enabling men to understand themselves and their fellows better, furnishes help in this great task—rather than "to diminish, if not remove, the ground for belief in moral responsibility and immortality, to erase the distinction of mind and body, and to accentuate instinctive action"—it will fulfill a most valuable service to humanity.

THE END

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